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Neo-Logicism and A Priori Arithmetic
Introduction
§1: The Development of Neo-Logicism
Frege's philosophy of arithmetic had at its core two central philosophical themes. The first is that 
arithmetical truths are truths about independently-existing objects. The second is that arithmetical 
truths are provable on the basis of logic and suitable definitions. Thus Frege subscribed both to a 
form of platonism and a form of logicism about parts of mathematics, of which arithmetic will be 
our concern here. In order to establish these philosophical results, Frege required that a technical 
task be completed first. Such a task comprised the development of a logically perfect language – his 
Begriffsschrift – in which one could interpret the truths of arithmetic. Thus Frege both invented a 
system of logic, and interpreted arithmetic in that logic.
On a modern understanding of logic as the investigation of what holds in any domain whatever, it 
becomes  clear  very  quickly  that  these  two  core  theses  do  not  sit  easily  together.  If  truths  of 
arithmetic are to be truths of logic and arithmetic is about particular objects, then logic can no 
longer  be viewed in  such a  way.  However,  it  is  when the  epistemological character  of  Frege's 
logicism is  brought  into  focus  that  the  apparent  tension  is  resolved.  We  must  hold  apart  the 
semantic, metaphysical and epistemological to put Frege's project in its proper place.
Firstly, there is the semantic thesis – what Wright calls “number-theoretic realism” – that holds that 
we should take “the Peano axioms... and their logical consequences, however that class is to be 
characterised, as being truths of some sort”1 and that they are truths independently of whether or not 
1 Wright (1983), p.xiv
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they are  ever  formulated or  in  principle  verifiable.  Secondly there is  the metaphysical  thesis  – 
Frege's  platonism –  that  these  mathematical  statements  are  true  or  false  in  virtue  of  particular 
mathematical objects being some way or other. Thirdly there is Frege's epistemological logicism; 
that pure logic can provide a basis for our understanding and knowledge of mathematics. Wright 
stresses  this  by pointing  out  that  “Frege's  question is  surely a  good one:  what  [could  be]  the 
ultimate... source of our knowledge of number-theoretical statements?”2 It is to what extent and why 
Frege and Wright's answers to this question are defective that will be examined in this thesis.
Frege most clearly expresses the centrality of this question in §62 of his Grundlagen der Arithmetik  
(1884) when he has finished giving his positive argument for platonism. Given his repudiation of 
the competing psychological theories of the metaphysics and epistemology of arithmetic, he asks 
“how, then, should a number be given to us, if we can have no idea or intuition of it?”3. His answer 
appeals to one of his guiding principles: his famous context 'Context Principle', the dictum that one 
should  “never...  ask  for  the  meaning  of  a  word  in  isolation,  but  only  in  the  context  of  a 
proposition”4.  This  principle  both  legitimises  and enforces  the  use  of  some kind  of  contextual 
definition of number if his logicism is to be vindicated.  The first definition that Frege put up for 
evaluation was what became known as Hume's Principle:
(HP): F G [#F = #G ∀ ∀ ↔ (F ≈ G)] for ≈ := “can be put into 1-1 correspondence with”
However, he found it wanting not for mathematical but for philosophical reasons. He saw such 
definitions as insufficient to decide all identity statements of the form '#F = x' when x is not an 
expression of the form '#G' – for example, if x stood for Julius Caesar. He saw such “nonsensical 
examples” as a useful heuristic device to demonstrate the inadequacy of such a definition. He writes 
that “Naturally no-one is ever going to confuse [Julius Caesar] with [the number 3], but this is no 
2 Ibid., p.xxi
3 Frege (1884), §62
4 Ibid., Introduction
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thanks to our definition.”5 This lack of discriminatory power of the definition was for Frege an 
intractable difficulty.
Given his inability to overcome the Julius Caesar problem, Frege moved on to a definition based on 
extensions of concepts, the theory of which he saw as being a part of logic. As such, whilst his 
definition of number was to be explicit, he introduces extensions of concepts (in terms of which he 
would define number) using his preferred method of contextual definition. However, for an operator 
to be a part of logic would require logical laws to govern the use of that operator, which led Frege to 
introduce Basic Law V:
(BLV): F G [{x:Fx} = {x:Gx} ∀ ∀ ↔ x (Fx ∀ ↔ Gx)]
Frege was a little wary of BLV, writing that:
“A dispute  can  arise,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  only  with  regard  to  my  Basic  Law 
concerning courses-of-values (V), which logicians have not yet expressly enunciated, 
and yet is what people have in mind, for example, where they speak of the extensions 
of concepts.”6
And, later:
“I have never concealed from myself its lack of self-evidence which the [other basic 
laws of logic] possess, and which must be properly demanded of a law of logic, and 
in fact I pointed out this weakness [in the quotation given above].”7
5 Ibid., §66
6 Frege (1893), Introduction
7 Frege (1903), Appendix
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Frege nonetheless held that it was a logical law. Indeed, it seems obviously true – it states that two 
concepts have the same extensions just when the same objects fall under each concept. However, 
the adoption of BLV was disastrous. The principle entails a contradiction, giving rise to Russell's 
paradox. This can be most clearly seen by considering that BLV entails that every concept has an 
extension; as such,  we can let  F be the concept 'is  a concept that  is  not a  member of its  own 
extension.' Thus the extension of F is made up of concepts. We then ask the question whether or not 
F is in its own extension: if it is, then it is not a member of its own extension, and so it is not; but if 
it is not, then it is a concept that is not a member of its own extension and hence is in the extension 
of F after all – a contradiction. Frege's own response to the paradox was to attempt to patch BLV in 
some way so as to block the derivation of the paradox. However, he had little faith in such a fix 
which indeed ultimately proved unsuccessful, as it still contained a contradiction. This failure was 
enough to make Frege abandon his logicist project.
Wright's Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects (1983) is an attempt to demonstrate that Frege's 
judgement was premature. He develops the kernel of Frege's logicism in a slightly different way 
that does not fall foul of the same contradiction. The observation that motivates such a view is that 
we can break down Frege's derivation of the second-order Peano axioms (PA2) from BLV into two 
stages. The first is to derive HP, and the second is from there to derive PA2 – no further use of BLV 
is required. As such, Wright proposes to base the relevant definitions on HP rather than on BLV; he 
then  argues  doing so preserves  many of  the Fregean insights  that  motivated  his  philosophy of 
arithmetic.8
As with Frege's own programme, there were two parts to Wright's proposal; one mathematical, one 
philosophical. The technical result is what has become known as Frege's Theorem: that the second-
order Peano axioms are equi-interpretable in a theory that appends HP to second-order logic. Call 
such  a  system second-order  Frege  Arithmetic  (FA2).  The  philosophical  aspect  is  to  assess  the 
8 Of course, this raises the substantial issue of why Wright found the Julius Caesar problem less intractable than did 
Frege. However, in this thesis I set this issue aside.
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significance  of  such  a  result.  Wright  concedes  that  HP is  not  a  truth  of  logic,  and  hence  his 
programme is designed to establish a conclusion somewhat weaker than Frege's own conception. 
However, he claims that HP is analytic and that this is sufficient to demonstrate the analyticity of its 
logical consequences – in particular, the theorems of elementary number theory.
§2: Benacerraf's Challenge
In this thesis, I assess neo-logicism taken as a response to a specific challenge that can be seen most 
clearly in light of Benacerraf's classic paper 'Mathematical Truth' (1973). Benacerraf aims to give 
necessary conditions for a semantics and an epistemology of mathematics to be adequate before 
going on to show that these requirements are in tension. Both the semantic and epistemological 
requirements derive from the thought that there is nothing particularly special about mathematics, 
and as such our semantics (epistemology) for mathematical discourse should be the same as our 
semantics (epistemology) for any other area of discourse. What we need to do is “integrate” our 
mathematical knowledge with our corpus of knowledge from other areas of discourse.
These conditions are given a very intuitive and very minimal gloss. Benacerraf takes it that the only 
reasonable candidate for the more general semantics is a Tarskian theory of truth, whilst the only 
reasonable candidate for the more general epistemology is a causal theory. There are two important 
points here. Firstly, he acknowledges that there are difficulties in both theories, but he sees the devil 
as being in the detail.  There is something compelling about referential semantics and a broadly 
empiricist  conception  of  knowledge that  gives  us  at  least  a  prima facie  reason to  accept  these 
requirements however they are to be cashed out. Secondly, if either of these minimal requirements 
are to be rejected as being appropriate for mathematics, we have two options; either we explain why 
mathematics  is,  despite  appearances,  'special',  or  we  give  a  new  theory  at  the  same  level  of 
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generality that can make sense of mathematical and non-mathematical discourse and knowledge. 
This brings out the key point that Benacerraf's challenge cannot be brushed off by attacking his 
theoretical commitments; to do so would be to treat only the symptoms rather than the underlying 
disease.
Thus we have two requirements that derive from a desire to treat mathematics on a par with other 
areas  of  discourse  –  one  semantic,  one  epistemological.  Benacerraf's  main  claim is  that  these 
requirements cannot be satisfied simultaneously. A commitment to Tarskian (referential) semantics 
for mathematical discourse involves a commitment to the existence of mathematical objects which 
seem  to  have  no  causal  or  empirical  properties  whatsoever.  As  such,  we  cannot  explain  the 
knowledge that we have in terms of our more general, empiricist, epistemology. Thus the challenge 
can only be met by weakening one or other requirement in some way; but such a strategy, of course, 
entails rejecting the very plausible and minimal conditions offered by Benacerraf.
This very brisk overview of Benacerraf's challenge roughly parallels Wright's presentation of the 
issue. According to Wright, we need go no further. He writes:
“[T]he worry about the unintelligibility of abstract objects is a vaguely-based worry; 
and the empiricist challenge is in any case clear enough for our present purpose. For 
if we hold that we are capable of grasping abstract sortal concepts, then, at the very 
least,  we  attribute  to  ourselves  the  ability  to  identify  and  to  distinguish  among 
themselves objects which fall under those concepts, and to distinguish them from 
objects of other kinds. And now, how could such an ability possibly be acquired by a 
respectable empirical route when there is no such thing as an empirical confrontation 
with  an  abstract  object  –  when  abstract  objects  are  constitutionally  incapable  of 
presenting themselves to us in experience? The just challenge posed to the platonist 
is  that  he explain  how an  understanding  of  any abstract  sortal  concept  could  be 
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imparted to anyone whose concept-acquiring powers are subject to the constraints 
imposed by human sensory limitations.”9
However, to see Benacerraf's challenge in such a fashion seems to me to be slightly too quick. Both 
Wright's way of setting up the problem and his way of solving it10 seem to miss the mark. In chapter 
1 I develop the challenge a little in order to help come to an assessment of whether or not Wright's 
proposed solution can be a good one.
Whilst most of the discussion of the problem will be deferred to chapter 1, it is very important (even 
at this early stage) to be clear on the precise nature of the epistemological challenge that is being put 
forward and hence the required nature of any appropriate neo-logicist resolution. The problem is not 
what we might term (following Burgess11)  hermeneutic, where the aim is to make sense of actual 
mathematical  epistemic  practice,  but  nor  is  it  straightforwardly  reconstructive  or  revolutionary, 
where  our  aim  is  to  say  in  what  our  mathematical  epistemic  practice  could  (or,  on  some 
interpretations, should) consist.
To  deal  with  the  former  (somewhat  uncontroversial)  claim  first;  what  is  at  issue  is  how  our 
knowledge  is  possible,  not  the  processes  by  which  it  becomes  actual.  The  kind  of  sceptical 
challenge that is being put forward is that knowledge of even basic arithmetical facts is impossible 
if we take it that mathematical objects (such as numbers) are mind-independent, abstract objects. 
Thus an acceptable response is to demonstrate that a route to knowledge is possible – to demand 
that we discover the actual route to arithmetical knowledge is therefore misguided.
The latter claim requires more delicate handling. The problem with seeing the task as being simply 
reconstructive is to miss an important constraint of the challenge. This element is noted by various 
9 Wright (1983), pp.5-6
10 In particular, see his (1983) §i and §xi respectively.
11 Introduced in Burgess (1983)
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writers;  as  Dummett  puts  it,  “in  giving  definitions  [from  which  we  can  derive  the  laws  of 
arithmetic],  we must be faithful to the received senses of arithmetical expressions”12. Or Wright; 
“Frege's  intention  is  not  merely  to  introduce  a  language-game  of  natural  number  with  some 
affinities to our pre-existent use of arithmetical concepts; rather, he means to give a philosophical 
account in depth of that pre-existent use.”13 This point is crucial, as it helps to bring out that we 
need to explain the knowledge that we in fact have, and not knowledge of some facts expressed by 
concepts that we have simply made up for our own purposes. We cannot redefine arithmetical and 
mathematical notions at will – to do that would give us a route to knowledge of a quite different 
kind to that which we actually have.
The point is most clearly seen by MacBride, who puts it as follows:
“[T]he neo-Fregean claims [that] HP – properly understood – is nothing more than a 
stipulation that serves to introduce a novel operator into our language...  And it is 
because HP is intended merely as a stipulation that the neo-Fregean feels able to 
legitimately claim that HP is a priori. Nevertheless, the neo-Fregean continues, HP 
provides a basis for grasping arithmetical truths a priori because (as Frege's Theorem 
demonstrates) the system that results from HP and second-order logic allows for a 
reconstruction of ordinary arithmetical  practice in the following sense. It  – Frege 
arithmetic – suffices for the interpretation of the laws of ordinary arithmetic and the 
proof of their interpretations. It is in virtue of the interpretative powers of the system 
HP engenders that  the neo-Fregean takes himself  to be retrospectively entitled to 
characterise HP as an arithmetical principle.”14
The key point here is that if HP or a similar principle is to ground our knowledge of arithmetic, then 
12 Dummett (1991), p.179 (emphasis added)
13 Wright (1983), p.106
14 MacBride (2002), p.129
10
there is  an important constraint  on its  acceptability that  is  determined by 'ordinary arithmetical 
practice.' The stipulation of HP is both acceptable and relevant only if it can be demonstrated that it 
characterises  the  concept  of  cardinal  number  that  is  used  to  frame arithmetical  truths.  We can 
introduce  a  new operator  at  will,  governed by principles  that  will  be  analytic  and  a  priori  by 
stipulation, but that will be of assistance only if the new operator turns out to correspond exactly to 
an old operator. Thus an appropriate response to the sceptic is to provide an explanation of how we 
could come to have the knowledge that we in fact have; to give a response in terms of how we could 
have had knowledge had we used different, reconstructed, concepts is inadequate.
§3: The Neo-Logicist Solution
Wright's response to Benacerraf, then, is that we can explain our arithmetical knowledge in terms of 
mastery of arithmetical discourse. Such mastery is attained by understanding HP, which is accorded 
the status of an analytic truth. As such, it is true just in virtue of the meanings of the terms contained 
within the principle and so we can know it just by understanding those meanings. But if any logical 
consequence of an analytic truth is itself an analytic truth, then the truths of arithmetic (by Frege's 
Theorem)  are  likewise  analytic,  and  hence  arithmetical  statements  can  be  known  simply  by 
understanding  the  meanings  of  the  terms  contained  within.  Thus  there  is  an  a  priori  route  to 
knowledge of arithmetic. We understand the meaning of the constituents of HP, thereby making us 
able to know the truth of HP itself. This understanding (and understanding of second-order logic) is 
sufficient  to  derive  any  truth  of  arithmetic  that  is  entailed  by  the  Peano  axioms.  As  such,  if 
analyticity transmits across logical consequence, we can know any truth of arithmetic entailed by 
the Peano axioms.15
15 A certain amount of care is required here. The claim is limited to truths derivable from the Peano axioms rather than 
all truths of arithmetic because the argument given here will not help us ascertain the truth of the Gödel sentence for 
FA2, for example. However, the neo-logicist can argue that to require that we need use his approach to explain all 
our arithmetical knowledge is too demanding – we only need to be able to explain enough of such knowledge to get 
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It  is worth noting that whether or not this kind of proposal is correct,  it  does at least have the 
requisite structure; it seeks to explain how arithmetical knowledge is possible. It is  arithmetical 
knowledge because HP is supposed to adequately characterise our concept of cardinal number, and 
it is knowledge at all because HP and its logical consequences are analytic. Wright is well aware of 
this when he assesses the significance of his conclusion as follows:
“Frege's idea is one of immense importance if it can be sustained. Abstract objects 
are  sometimes  thought  of  as  constituting  a  'third  realm',  a  sphere  of  being  truly 
additional to and independent from the concrete world of causal space-time. It is this 
conception of the abstract which generates the well-known epistemological problems 
to which nominalism and various forms of reductionism and structuralism attempt to 
respond. But if anything like – or to the extent that – the Fregean conception can be 
sustained, there can be no epistemological difficulties posed by thought about and 
knowledge of any particular species of abstract objects which are not already present 
on the right-hand side of the abstraction which initially introduces the concept of that 
species. That is not to say that all such problems disappear. But it is a tremendous 
gain in manageability. And the blanket idea, that there has to be a general problem 
about thought and knowledge of abstracta, just in virtue of their being abstract, is 
quite undermined.”16
Thus Wright's proposal, if it can be sustained, is one that tackles Benacerraf's challenge head-on. He 
takes it that there is a genuine explanatory challenge here, but he believes that there is a satisfactory 
response based on Frege's insights.
us started, so to speak. This point is rather more delicate than this brief discussion might indicate, but owing to 
spatial constraints I cannot give it the attention it deserves.
16 Wright (1997) pp.278-9
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§4: Neo-Logicism and the Solution Space.
It  is  worth  pausing  at  this  point  to  note  that  taking  Benacerraf's  challenge  as  a  starting  point 
provides  a  good  way  to  reveal  the  commitments  of  each  of  the  major  'isms'  of  20th Century 
philosophy of mathematics.17 For example, Hilbertian formalists deny that (at least non-finitary) 
mathematical statements are truths or falsehoods about mathematical objects (and hence reject the 
semantic  requirement),  maintaining  instead  that  what  we  take  to  be  truths  are  theorems  of  a 
particular formal system. Fictionalists endorse one part of Benacerraf's semantic requirement by 
maintaining that we have the same kinds of truth  conditions for mathematical statements as for 
natural language, but deny that there are any such objects that could make such statements true18. 
Much of the work, then, involves giving both an account of knowledge and an account of what 
makes some mathematical statements more acceptable than others. Intuitionists, on the other hand, 
can be agnostic on whether or not Benacerraf's semantic requirement of  homogeneity  is a good 
one19. The claim is that we need non-classical semantics (and logic) for mathematics, and this does 
not give rise to the problems of reference and knowledge brought in by Tarskian semantics. Thus 
they  either  reject  Benacerraf's  problem outright  or  claim that  it  stems  from a  commitment  to 
classical logic and semantics in natural language.
Nearer to an acceptance of the challenge is Quinean holism. The holist takes the key question to be 
not  how  we  can  explain  our  knowledge  of  facts  about  mathematical  objects,  but  whether  the 
existence of and our knowledge of such objects is required by our best scientific theories. If so, then 
whilst we do not have an explanation of our knowledge per se, we do at least have a justification of 
17 Incidentally, this brings out that neo-logicism is the only 'ism' that accepts that there is a genuine explanatory gap 
highlighted by Benacerraf's paper and seeks to fill it.
18 Of course fictionalists do not wish to deny that all mathematical or arithmetical statements are literally true. 'There is 
no greatest prime number' would be an instance of a true claim on a fictionalist account, albeit one justified in a 
rather different way than on a classical, platonist account.
19 Although, of course, an intuitionist need not be; Dummett, for instance, recommends that the use of non-classical 
logic and semantics should be more widespread than just mathematics.
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our beliefs  – that  they are entailed by some more fundamental  theory.  As such,  the holist  sees 
Benacerraf  as  going  too  far  in  demanding an  explanation  of  our  knowledge over  and above a 
pragmatic  view  of  its  indispensability.  Again,  the  challenge  is  rejected  –  Benacerraf  has  not 
provided necessary conditions on the acceptability of a philosophy of mathematics. 
Of the prominent philosophical views of mathematics on offer today, neo-logicism is the only one 
that tackles the issues raised by the challenge without in some way seeking to weaken or reject it. 
Therefore an investigation of neo-logicism is philosophically worthwhile provided, of course, that 
the challenge is a good one. As such, in the first chapter I motivate and defend the importance of the 
challenge applied to platonist theories of mathematics. I then explore the first part of the apparently 
promising neo-logicist line of response based on the linguistic turn as underwritten by the Context 
Principle.
However, even if this linguistic response to the challenge is in principle legitimate, for all that will 
have been said there is no guarantee that this strategy will work. If there is no acceptable way to put 
flesh on the bones, then neo-logicism is no more than a pipe dream. As such, in the remainder of the 
thesis I examine and assess possible developments of the core neo-logicist theses. In chapter 2 I 
scrutinise Wright's theory, concluding that whilst his approach is inadequate, it fails for interesting 
reasons. As such, in chapter 3 I give a reconstruction of Wright's argument and alter some key 
premises such that a marginally weaker and significantly more plausible conclusion is reached. I 
close with a brief discussion of the outstanding issues.
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Chapter 1
§1: Benacerraf's Challenge
In his seminal (1973), Benacerraf outlines a dilemma for any philosophy of mathematics. He offers 
two constraints on any acceptable theory that are mutually exclusive. The first is that we must have 
“a homogeneous semantic theory in which semantics for the propositions of mathematics parallel 
the  semantics  for  the  rest  of  the  language.”20 The  second  is  that  the  same  must  hold  for  our 
epistemology of mathematics – there should be a similar parallel between how we know purely 
mathematical statements and how we know other kinds of statement. Another way of putting this 
latter requirement is that we must be able to explain our mathematical knowledge in terms of a 
more  general  theory  of  knowledge.  Benacerraf  argues  that  these  constraints  are  necessary 
conditions for the adequacy of any account and that moreover that one can only be met at  the 
expense of the other.
He first  of  all  gives a sketch of a  minimal version of what he calls  “the standard view”.21 He 
introduces such a view by way of an illustration. He gives the following two sentences:
A. There are at least three large cities older than New York
B. There are at least three perfect numbers greater than 17
And asks whether they both share the following logico-grammatical form:
C. There are at least three FG's that bear R to a.22
20 Benacerraf (1973) p.403
21 Ibid., p.410
22 Ibid., p.405
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Benacerraf claims that (A) ought to be analysed as being of the form of (C), with 'a' naming some 
particular object ('New York'). The two key components of such an analysis are that singular terms 
are used to name particular objects, and that the resulting proposition is truth-evaluable. Benacerraf 
further notes that many philosophers have been less willing to analyse (B) in a parallel fashion. In 
order to endorse an alternative analysis, one must reject one of the components given above. As 
such,  either  surface  grammar  is  no  indication  of  an  appropriate  semantics,  or  mathematical 
statements  are  not  truth-evaluable.  Benacerraf  claims  that  all  accounts  that  lack  one  or  other 
component are defective, as they fail to satisfy his semantic requirement.
The semantic requirement has two components that Benacerraf does not fully distinguish. The first 
is  that  the  semantics  for  mathematical  statements  should  be  the  same  as  for  natural  language 
semantics  –  if  there  are  differences,  these  should  “emerge  at  the  level  of  the  analysis  of  the 
reference of the singular terms and predicates.”23 The second aspect is that we must explain why our 
mathematical  theorems  are  true,  rather  than  merely  being  theorems  of  some  formal  system. 
Benacerraf takes it that Tarskian semantics is the only one that can provide for this first (semantic) 
requirement. This has as a natural bedfellow some form of platonist ontology of mathematics, as the 
point of adopting such a (more general) semantics is to allow us to treat Benacerraf's (B) as we 
would (A) – namely, on the model of (C). In order for us to do this (and have (B) come out true) 
there must be some objects to which the singular terms in (B) refer.24 These objects must be either 
mind-dependent  or  mind-independent,  and  if  the  latter  then  either  physical  or  abstract. 
Mathematical objects are generally taken to be abstract, for good reason; whilst the alternatives may 
avoid  Benacerraf's  problem,  such  accounts  are  unsatisfactory for  a  variety  of  reasons,  a  fuller 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. As such, I will take it as a premise that if 
there are mathematical objects, then they are abstract; this is an assumption of what Benacerraf calls 
23 Ibid., p.406
24 It is worth noting that it is here where the two aspects of Benacerraf's semantic requirement come apart – one is free 
to adopt Tarskian semantics without believing in the literal truth of mathematical statements, as fictionalists do. In 
this chapter I will focus on the consequences of treating the semantic requirement as being linked to the truth of 
mathematical theorems, as Benacerraf does.
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the standard, platonist view.25
Benacerraf's bias towards a Tarskian semantics springs, by his own admission, from a lack of viable 
alternatives. However, Benacerraf takes this to be because such semantics are the only viable ones 
for natural language as a whole – he writes that his bias “stems simply from the fact that he has 
given  us  the  only viable  systematic  general  account we  have  of  truth.”26 There  are  plenty  of 
alternative formulations of mathematical semantics, but each is inadequate without an explanation 
of how truth in referential languages links with truth in the new mathematical language. The point is 
that any new semantics must have the right level of generality, but on that level there are no good 
alternatives to Tarski.
So much for the first constraint; we account for the truth of mathematical theorems by appeal to the 
existence of abstract objects and their possession of certain properties. What of the second? The 
claim is  that  “we have  mathematical  knowledge,  and  it  is  none  the  less  knowledge  for  being 
mathematical.”27 Moreover, “it must be possible to link up what it is for p to be true with my belief 
that p.”28 This condition is a feature of any epistemology – the difference between any two accounts 
comes in at the level of how truth and belief are linked. Benacerraf takes it that the requisite link 
must be of the form of a causal explanation – it must be possible to establish some appropriate 
causal explanation between the truth of p and my belief that p in order for me to count as knowing 
that  p.  This,  for  Benacerraf,  is  the  more  general  epistemology  into  which  our  account  of 
mathematical truth must mesh.
Thus we have two constraints – that we must be able to explain our mathematical knowledge, and 
that  mathematical  statements  must  be  truth-evaluable  in  the  same  way  as  natural  language 
statements. Can both be met simultaneously? Benacerraf's claim is that they cannot. The standard 
25 Loc. cit.
26 Ibid., p.411 (emphasis added)
27 Ibid., p.409
28 Loc. cit.
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view's platonist metaphysics consists of non-spatial, non-temporal, non-causal objects. There cannot 
be any causal chain involving such objects, so a fortiori there can be no causal explanation of how 
the truth of some statement p that refers to one of these objects is linked to one's belief that p. As 
such, mathematical knowledge is impossible without violating Benacerraf's second constraint. 
§2. Benacerraf Generalised
Under  Benacerraf's  own formulation  of  the  problem,  it  might  appear  open to  reject  the  either 
Tarskian semantics or a causal theory of knowledge. However, to think that this is adequate would 
be  to  miss  both the  force and the generality of  the challenge.  The  theoretical  commitments  to 
Tarskian semantics and a causal theory of knowledge come from their being representative of a 
more general species of theory. The semantic issue is that our choice of semantics is constrained by 
the kind of analysis required of (A), (B) and (C); Benacerraf does not claim that Tarskian semantics 
is necessarily the only option, but he claims (almost in passing) that it is both the only viable option 
and that it is only the referential aspect of such semantics that matter.
Similarly, the causal theory of knowledge is being used to fill a theoretical lacuna. The point is that 
our mathematical knowledge is in need of explanation, but that this explanation must have the form 
of a more general epistemology that can incorporate or “integrate”29 our knowledge of mathematics. 
It is therefore an open question whether such an explanation need posit causal links. But to merely 
say that the causal theory of knowledge is inappropriate for explaining mathematical knowledge is 
to leave an explanatory gap. If the causal theory is rejected, some alternative theory is required to 
fill its place – otherwise we cannot explain our mathematical knowledge.
29 Peacocke (1999), ch.1
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The real puzzle is to explain how we, flesh-and-blood creatures, can come to know anything about 
the world. Any explanation must be able to account for the difference between knowing facts about 
objects and not having such knowledge; Benacerraf takes it that the best (but not the only) candidate 
theory is a causal one. However it seems impossible that in the case of abstract objects there could 
be anything (causal or otherwise) to ground an explanation of such a difference. As Field notes, “the 
problem is that the claims that the platonist makes about mathematical objects appear to rule out 
any reasonable strategy for explaining the systematic correlation in question.”30 There is a tension 
between the ways in which we take ourselves to know about the world and the ways in which we 
could in principle come to know about mathematical objects. Thus any reasonable positive accounts 
of the semantics and epistemology of mathematics are incompatible.
Another  way in  which  we  might  further  generalise  Benacerraf's  challenge  is  to  note  that  the 
difficulty that he identifies is largely independent of philosophy of mathematics. This is noted by 
Benacerraf when he says that “although it will often be convenient to present my discussion in 
terms of theories of mathematical truth, we should always bear in mind that what is really at issue is 
our over-all philosophical view.”31 Thus the version of the challenge under scrutiny here is equally 
applicable to any area of discourse that resolves semantic issues by appeal to abstract objects. An 
example  is  modal  discourse,  in  which  one  might  appeal  to  possible  worlds  in  order  to  give  a 
semantics  for  statements  about  necessary or  contingent  truths.  If  these  worlds  are  taken  to  be 
abstract in any way (such as sets of true sentences, or some kind of abstract version of the actual 
world),  then the same problem would then arise:  how can we explain any knowledge of these 
possible worlds? The challenge to supporters  of abstract  objects is  that  difficulties arise just  in 
virtue of their being abstract.
A further issue is that whilst Benacerraf emphasises the epistemological nature of the problem for 
those who adopt  a  platonist  metaphysical  picture,  there  is  a parallel  problem for reference and 
30 Field (1984), p.231
31 Benacerraf (1973), p.405
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thought. The idea here is that Field's point above – that any reasonable strategy for explaining how 
we might know about abstract objects is ruled out by their being abstract – applies equally well to 
strategies for explaining how we are able to even think about these objects.  The problem is to 
account for some feature of our thinking about mathematical objects and the objects themselves; the 
claim is that this connection is inexplicable. Again, the problem is independent of any particular 
theory of reference – what matters is that on  any  way of filling out how we can refer to objects, 
abstract objects will be referentially inaccessible.
The referential challenge is to ask that given the possibility of referential failure, what justifies our 
thinking that we are referentially successful? It is important to note here that the relevant question is 
not what  constitutes referential success – this question is one appropriately answered by giving a 
theory of reference.  Instead,  we must ask how (even if  it  is  conceded that we are referentially 
successful when talking about mathematical objects) we can explain how we could possibly be 
referentially successful. This in turn brings out two important features of the challenge. Firstly, it is 
independent  of  any  particular  theory  of  reference.  Secondly,  the  issue  is  not  predominately 
ontological – the point is that whilst there may or may not be such things as abstract objects, there is 
a difficulty in explaining how we, with our limitations, could think about or know facts about these 
utterly undetectable objects.
With  these  issues  in  mind,  we  should  consider  Ebert's32 thought-provoking  reconstruction  of 
Benacerraf's challenge as being based on the following premises:
1. Homogeneous Semantic Theory: the demand that we adopt a general and systematic theory 
of truth, which – for Benacerraf – should be a Tarskian theory of truth.
2. Surface Grammar: the demand to respect the surface grammar of mathematical discourse.
3. Reference and Object-Directed Thought: the demand to explain how the objects posited by 
32 Ebert (2006)
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the semantic theory can, in principle, be in the range of directed thought and talk of the 
subjects.
4. Knowledge: the demand to reconcile the truths of the subject matter with what can be known 
by ordinary human thinkers. Crucial here is to provide an explanation of how a subject can 
have mathematical knowledge and on what basis the subject can claim such knowledge.33
It seems to me that this kind of reconstruction is a good one, even if Ebert's own attempt slightly 
misses the mark. For instance, it is not clear that Ebert is committed (as Benacerraf is) to taking 
certain mathematical statements to be true, even if the semantics for mathematical discourse is to 
mirror that of natural language as demanded by Homogeneous Semantic Theory. But despite this, 
the thrust of his first premise captures the generality requirement put forward by Benacerraf.
Ebert's Surface Grammar is a demand for mathematical syntax and semantics to be treated as part 
of  a  more general  theory.  This  dictates  that  syntax should be as  good a  guide to  semantics  in 
mathematical discourse as in natural language. It may be objected that in natural language, syntax is 
a very poor guide to semantics. Whilst this is true, it does not get to the heart of the issue. The 
requirement  is  not  that  a  syntactically  well-formed  sentence  should  be  equally  well-formed 
semantically,  but  only  that  syntax  informs  semantics  with  respect  to  reference.  Mathematical 
singular terms that 'look referential' should refer.
Of course, there are plenty of instances in natural language where what might be taken to be a 
singular term is clearly non-referential – take Wright's cases of “I did it for John's  sake”, or “the 
whereabouts of the Prime Minister is unknown”34. However, not every noun phrase need be taken to 
be a singular term. This observation prompts two questions: when is a noun a singular term? And in 
the mathematical cases of interest, are the noun phrases singular terms? A discussion of the former 
question  involves  investigating  the  ways  of  refining  Frege  and Dummett's  criteria  for  singular 
33 Ibid., p.6
34 Wright (1983), p.26
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termhood and lies beyond the scope of this thesis35. However the second question is of interest, and 
to  answer  in  the  affirmative  is  a  good way to  capture  the  key point  of  the  Surface  Grammar 
requirement.  It  is  a  demand that  the  syntax  and semantics  of  mathematical  discourse does  not 
systematically depart from the normal cases in which syntax is a good guide to semantics. Once we 
have this, we can then restrict ourselves to considering sentences such as Benacerraf's (B) above – 
those containing mathematical singular terms that, by Surface Grammar, refer.
Reference and  Knowledge seem  to  bring  out  what  is  demanded  by  the  referential  and 
epistemological challenge respectively. The difficulty is to  explain how (“in principle”) we could 
possibly have acquired the knowledge of facts about abstract mathematical objects and the ability to 
think about and make reference to such objects. Ebert's parsing of the debate in such a way is done 
so that he can introduce what he labels the Fundamental Assumption of various responses that he 
discusses:  that  “if  there  is  a  priori  mathematical  knowledge and the  mathematical  discourse  is 
construed at face value, then there has to be some form of acquaintance with the objects involved 
that underwrites this knowledge.”36 Whilst this seems too strong – for instance, the requirement that 
a subject be acquainted with an object far outstrips the requirement of the existence of a causal link 
between subject and object given in Benacerraf's paper – Ebert is right to attempt to pin down the 
commitments of the genus of theories of knowledge or reference of which the causal theory is a 
species.
A more successful attempt to identify this kind of commitment is made by Hale and Wright when 
they criticise the idea that
“knowledge of truths about objects of any kind must involve some form of prior 
interaction or engagement with those objects. That notion is naturally taken to call 
35 Hale attempts to build on earlier work by Dummett in order to give such an account – see Hale (1994), (1996) and 
Dummett (1973), especially pp.54-8, 174-9.
36 Ibid., p.16
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for some kind of physical connection... and so is obviously inimical to the abstract. 
But it is not obviously a notion that must be accepted. To be sure: if we forget the 
'prior' and the notion is given a sufficiently broad construal, so that possession of any 
sort of identifying knowledge of an object suffices for 'engagement', the idea reduces, 
near enough, to a truism – one can hardly be credited with knowledge of truths about 
objects unless one knows which objects are in question. But so construed, it need 
raise no hurdle for platonism. The crucial thought – we should say: 'mistake' – is the 
additional idea that such engagement is presupposed by and must be already in place 
before any knowledge of truths about objects can be had.”37
The point is that there is no principle that  must be accepted that can be used to tell against the 
possibility of knowledge of facts about abstract objects. However, it is not fair to say that the lack of 
such a plausible principle draws the sting from Benacerraf's challenge; as has been emphasised, the 
challenge should be seen as a call for a  positive explanation rather than being a straightforward 
objection to platonism. The attraction to the kinds of “prior interaction or engagement” principles 
comes from the fact that such interaction or engagement with objects can help explain knowledge of 
facts about those objects; thus the rejection of such a principle leaves unfilled the explanatory gap 
highlighted by Benacerraf.
Instead, then, let us try the following reconstruction along the same lines as Ebert:
1. The correct semantics for mathematical discourse is the same as that for natural language.
2. The  syntax  of  mathematical  statements  is  a  good  guide  to  the  semantics  –  it  is  not 
systematically misleading. For instance, mathematical singular terms refer.
3. The correct theory of reference for mathematics is the same as that for natural language, a 
theory which must explain how subjects can think about and refer to the objects posited by 
37 Hale & Wright (2002), p.114
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the semantic theory.
4. The correct theory of knowledge for mathematics is the same as that for natural language, a 
theory which must explain how subjects could come to know facts about the objects posited 
by the semantic theory (if such facts are known).
This seems to capture what is right about Ebert's premises, and fits well with a parallel 'fundamental 
assumption':  that  the  explanation  demanded  by  (3)  and  (4)  must  involve  the  notion  of  “prior 
interaction or engagement”. This final assumption is somewhat loosely formulated, but Hale and 
Wright's point is that of the ways in which it could be fleshed out, each is unobjectionable if true or 
false if hostile to the platonist.
At first blush it seems obvious that accepting something like this assumption is necessary, and that 
as such it  may not be rejected lightly.  It  seems to unite the genus of theories of reference and 
knowledge to which I alluded earlier, and does seem to have a certain explanatory power – for how 
could  we  know  facts  about  objects  without  such  prior  engagement?  Therefore  to  reject  the 
assumption leaves a lacuna. In the remainder of this chapter I will discuss Hale and Wright's own 
(neo-Fregean) proposal – that we can know (at least) certain arithmetical truths by inference from a 
principle governing numerical identity, a principle that in turn has a particular explanatory epistemic 
status.
§3: The Linguistic Turn
Frege's linguistic turn is briefly summarised by Dummett as follows:
“[Frege's]  solution was to  invoke the Context  Principle:  only in  the context  of  a 
sentence does  a word have meaning.  On the strength of this,  Frege converts  the 
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problem into an enquiry how the sense of sentences containing terms for numbers are 
to  be  fixed.  There is  the  linguistic  turn.  The  Context  Principle  is  stated  as  an 
explicitly linguistic  one,  a  principle  concerning the meanings  of  words  and their 
occurrence  in  sentences;  and  so  an  epistemological  problem,  with  ontological 
overtones, is by its means converted into one about the meanings of sentences.”38
The crucial idea is that the 'normal' order of explanatory priority is reversed. Rather than explaining 
how we know the fact expressed by given sentences in terms of how we know facts about the 
constituents of that sentence, we can know facts about the objects to which each constituent of the 
sentence refers by understanding the contribution it makes to the truth-conditions of that sentence.
Benacerraf's  problem,  when  suitably  generalised,  is  a  demand  for  a  positive  explanation  of  a 
connection that, it is charged, cannot be adequate. This is because certain kinds of objects cannot fit 
into our account of semantics and truth whilst being epistemically accessible. The response is that 
we can gain knowledge of facts about such objects by understanding what it takes for sentences 
about such objects to be true. There are two thoughts here; firstly, that we do not need some prior 
understanding of the meaning of expressions that purport to refer to abstract objects in order to 
attain such mastery of the relevant discourse. Secondly, we do not need to explain how we can 
know  facts  about  certain  objects  in  terms  of  their  possession  of  properties  that  make  them 
epistemologically or referentially accessible – as indicated by the earlier quotation from Field, such 
an approach is unpromising. Instead an alternative explanatory route is available.
The neo-Fregean strategy applies the linguistic turn to abstraction principles in order to fix the sense 
of terms that purport to refer to numbers. Fregean Abstractions have the following form:
(FA): F G [ΦF = ΦG ∀ ∀ ↔ (F ≈ G)]
38 Dummett (1991), p.111
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Where F and G can be objects or concepts of any level, Φ is a term-forming functional operator on 
F and G, and ≈ is an equivalence relation on F and G.  A rough-and-ready characterisation of the 
main idea is to say that one can introduce singular terms on the LHS of the equivalence to give a 
criterion of identity to the objects to which such terms purport to refer. As the equivalence is a 
necessary one, we can say that both the LHS and RHS of the equivalence have the same truth-
conditions.  We  then  point  out  that  the  RHS  seems  to  be  epistemologically  and  referentially 
unproblematic; as such, we conclude that we can come to know facts about the objects that are the 
referents of the terms of the LHS and be warranted in taking our use of the terms of the LHS to be 
instances of referential success by citing their connection to the facts given by the truth-conditions 
of that expressed by the RHS.
This characterisation brings out that this application of the linguistic turn is best understood as a 
conjunction of two theses. This can be illustrated by considering the example used by Frege, the 
Directional Equivalence:
(DE): The direction of line a is the same as the direction as line b iff a is parallel to b.
Prima facie, the LHS of the biconditional makes explicit reference to abstract objects – namely, 
directions – whilst the RHS does not. Thus there is a substantive question as to which objects a 
speaker is committed if he is to endorse these equivalences. The first claim, then, is that each side of 
the abstraction makes reference to distinct kinds of objects and that they are as such ontologically  
plenitudinous: we should take it that in the case of DE, one ought to believe that both the concrete 
objects 'lines' and the abstract objects 'directions' exist. The second thesis is that we can explain the 
knowledge that we have about these directions as being derivative knowledge from knowledge of 
facts about parallel lines. Thus the RHS has explanatory or epistemic priority39 over the LHS. This 
39 A brief terminological note: Hale – cf. his (1995), pp.205-7 – calls these claims the 'epistemic priority' thesis and 
'ontological priority' thesis. I dislike the latter as it seems to suggest a (somewhat implausible) reading of 
abstractions that there is no commitment to the referents of the RHS at all. The point is that in the illustrative case of 
DE, we are committed to the existence of directions as well as (not instead of) lines.
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claim is that we can explain what facts we know about the objects referred to by the LHS by what 
we know about claims that fit the model of the RHS.
Both the epistemic priority thesis (EPT) and the ontological plenitude thesis (OPT) cannot be taken 
to be utterly general theses, but they need not be for them to serve the neo-logicist's purposes. For 
instance, the EPT should not be taken to apply to an abstraction principle governing criteria of 
identity for shapes – that 'shape (A) = shape (B) iff A is similar to B' – as in such a case, it is 
conceivably more plausible to explain similarity in terms of sameness of shape. However, each 
thesis need only apply to particular classes of abstraction principles which in turn may or may not 
have a neat characterisation. What is needed are general considerations in favour of each thesis that 
may or may not have exceptional cases; all that needs to be established is that a given abstraction 
fits the mould that is being pushed here.
With the OPT and the EPT made explicit, we can bring the characterisation of the linguistic turn 
into sharper focus and see exactly how it is supposed to solve the reference problem. The LHS 
contains terms that purport to refer; given the possibility of referential failure, what gives us warrant 
to  deny that  this  is  such  a  case?  The response  is  that  given  the  OPT,  we cannot  endorse  the 
apparently obvious abstraction without thereby believing in the abstract objects to which the LHS 
appears to make reference. By the EPT we can come to know the facts expressed by the abstraction 
under their description in terms of the vocabulary of the RHS (say, in terms of talk about parallel 
lines) without  requiring any understanding in terms of the vocabulary of the LHS (in  terms of 
directions). As such, we can justify our belief in abstract objects by our belief in the abstraction and 
our understanding of the facts that make the RHS of a given abstraction true.
My claim here is not that there  is any such abstraction principle that could justify our belief in 
mathematical abstracta – whether or not there is such a principle is a matter I investigate in chapters 
2  and 3.  The  claim at  this  point  is  only that  this  strategy could provide  the bare  bones  of  an 
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acceptable starting point – in other words, that there could be such a principle remains an epistemic 
possibility. To dispute this claim is to dispute the legitimacy of this kind of performance of the 
linguistic turn. It seems to me that there are three main ways one could do this. One could reject the 
EPT, reject the OPT, or reject the idea that the alleged necessary equivalence of abstractions are 
necessary in a way that underwrites the EPT and OPT. To reject the EPT is in effect to claim that it 
is  insufficient  for  knowledge,  or  to  warrant  referential  success,  to  understand  the  relevant 
abstractions and their RHS. To reject the OPT or the coherence of any suitable necessity of the 
abstraction is to claim that abstractions cannot in principle be adequate to bear this sort of burden.
It is important to note here that we are assuming at this point that abstraction principles are an 
acceptable form of (something like) implicit definition. This assumption is roundly criticised by 
Dummett, amongst others, but a discussion of this would take us too far afield40. The core of the 
neo-Fregean strategy is to use abstraction principles to generate results of particular interest, and 
then  claim that  (by the  linguistic  turn)  these  kinds  of  results  will  be  sufficient.  Of  course,  if 
abstraction principles are utterly without merit, then the strategy will fail; but this need not yet be of 
concern.  The relevant  issue here is  whether  abstraction principles can in principle generate the 
desired results, something that will not be the case if any of the objections raised in the previous 
paragraph have any substance.
In assessing the substance of these objections to the legitimacy of the linguistic turn, it will become 
clear that Frege's Context Principle is indispensable to one who wishes to defend the neo-Fregean 
corner. Hence before continuing with an examination of the EPT and OPT, it seems worthwhile 
taking the time to make clear exactly which tools are available to the neo-Fregean. As such, in the 
next section I discuss the Context Principle before going on to see how it can be used to justify the 
EPT and OPT.
40 See Dummett (1991), pp.226-9
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§4: The Context Principle
The Context Principle was first stated by Frege in the introduction to Grundlagen, writing that one 
should  “never...  ask  for  the  meaning  of  a  word  in  isolation,  but  only  in  the  context  of  a 
proposition.”41 Frege took it as a methodological principle of some sort; but as Dummett42 points 
out, the Context Principle is first and foremost a principle governing meaning. However, it  was 
endorsed by Frege  before he first  drew the distinction  between the sense and the  reference of 
expressions, and as such it is not clear at first whether it is right to interpret the Context Principle as 
governing sense, reference or both.43
To treat it as a principle governing sense is to give it a very plausible reading, as it amounts to “the 
conceptual  priority of thoughts  over  their  constituents:  the constituents  can be  grasped only as 
potential constituents of complete thoughts”44;  it  is moreover a principle that  “governed Frege's 
thinking from start to finish.”45 According to Hale and Wright46, it is this line of thought that is 
developed by Wittgenstein in his critique of the Augustinian conception of language. The idea here 
is that we do not learn a (first) language in a piecemeal way by grasping the individual constituents 
of thoughts and combining them to create complete thoughts; instead, we grasp those constituents 
by  understanding  the  contribution  that  they  make  to  the  thought.  This  is  obviously  fairly 
compressed, but the main idea seems compelling; moreover it is one that has the assent of the main 
protagonists in the debate.
But what of treating the Context Principle as governing reference? According to Dummett,  it is 
41 Frege (1884), Introduction
42 Dummett (1991), p.183
43 Whether or not it was Frege's intention to endorse the principle in any such way is not my main concern. I will only 
be interested in assessing the plausibility of the principle as so construed.
44 Ibid., p.184
45 Loc. cit.
46 See Hale and Wright (2002), especially pp.113-9
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coming to an assessment on this matter that is the primary task of much of Wright's (1983). Wright 
interprets  the  Context  Principle  as  “the  thesis  of  the  priority  of  syntactic  over  ontological 
categories.”47 This is  explicated as the view that “the category of objects in particular,  is  to be 
explained as comprising everything which might be referred to by a  singular  term, where it  is 
understood that possession of reference is imposed on a singular term by its occurrence in true 
statements of an appropriate type.”48 Thus it is not that we assess whether or not the singular terms 
in a given sentence have reference before going on to assign a truth value to that sentence; instead 
we make that assignment of a truth value and understand the reference of terms by the contribution 
that they make to that assignment.
Views of this kind would have two further requirements; that there is a plausible means by which 
we can determine the truth-conditions of sentences, and that there is a plausible characterisation of 
singular termhood. However, it is important to get the dialectic right in each case. With respect to 
the latter, syntactic, requirement, Dummett proposes that we “understand [Wright's term 'syntactic 
role'] somewhat loosely; we may perhaps leave problems of syntactic classification to be dealt with  
as they arise, contenting ourselves with the reflection that we can in practice judge reasonably well 
whether or not an expression would count as being a 'proper name', even if we cannot precisely 
formulate the principles underlying our judgements.”49 The point here is that there need not be a 
demand for a detailed account of what counts as a singular term – good judgement is all that is 
required.
How do things stand with respect to our other, truth-conditional, requirement? At first it is not clear 
exactly to what this requirement amounts; if we are working within a broadly referential semantics, 
sentences containing apparently referring terms are true or false only if the relevant terms actually 
refer. But perhaps to see the requirement in this way reveals that we are free to choose our method 
47 Wright (1983), p.51
48 Ibid., p.52
49 Dummett (1991), pp.185-6 (emphasis mine)
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of determining truth-conditions apart from and prior to our worrying about the reference of the 
relevant singular terms. Again, the point seems to be that (at least for the time being) we are entitled 
to use our judgement.
How might this bear on our problem of justifying our belief in the existence of certain kinds of 
abstract objects and our mathematical knowledge? To answer this it is helpful to consider Fine's50 
enlightening gloss on the Context Principle. He points out that the problem arises because we have 
no  way of  distinguishing  actually  referring  terms  from merely potentially  referring  terms  with 
respect  to  certain  kinds  of  abstract  objects.  We take it  that  abstractions  are  a  suitable  class  of 
sentences that  contain the relevant singular  terms,  and that we are  laying down the abstraction 
principles “from a standpoint in which the existence of the objects that are to be assigned to the 
terms is not presupposed.”51 However, if such a stipulation is successful then we have guaranteed 
referents for the singular terms of the LHS. He puts it  in terms of an adoption of the Context 
Principle as, in effect, a way of bridging the gap between potential and actual reference. He writes
“The  general  idea  behind  the  principle...is  that  linguistic  practice  may be  partly 
constitutive of reference. The fact that certain terms are used in a certain way may 
guarantee, in conjunction with the appropriate non-linguistic facts, that those terms 
refer and that they refer to what they do... The view is that the apparently referential 
behaviour of terms may help secure their reference: terms that behave as if they refer 
will refer, given that the appropriate non-linguistic facts are in their favour.”52
Thus Fine's interpretation of the Context Principle seems to provide, in one sense, a very direct 
solution to the reference problem. The world may or may not be such that for any given potentially 
referring term, that term actually refers; the point is that working out whether or not we succeed is 
not a matter of giving an account of an apparently mysterious connection between ourselves and the 
50 Fine (2002)
51 Ibid., p.56
52 Ibid., p.57
31
relevant objects, but is instead a matter of certain non-linguistic facts obtaining and of linguistic 
practices. The alleged problem for platonism is that even if there are abstract objects, there is no 
way that we can account for our ability to refer to them. One reading of Fine's response is that the 
Context Principle can do just that – if there are such abstract objects, then linguistic practice will 
help  guarantee  referential  success.  However,  whilst  this  response  is  along  the  right  lines  it  is 
somewhat oversimplified; I will return to it in discussion of the OPT.
A similarly provisional and underdeveloped response to the knowledge problem (to which I will 
return in chapter 3) can be seen to come from these considerations. This point is addressed by Hale 
and Wright who (in the context of a discussion of DE taken as an illustrative abstraction) say that:
“So long as we can ascertain that certain lines are parallel, there need be no further 
problem about our knowledge of certain basic kinds of facts about directions, for all 
their abstractness. For provided that the concept direction can be implicitly defined 
by Fregean abstraction, we can know statements of direction-identity to be true just 
by knowing the truth of the appropriate statements of parallelism among lines. We 
can do so for the unremarkable reason that the truth-conditions of the former are 
fixed by stipulation to coincide with those of the latter.”53
Part of what makes this kind of response merely provisional is that it appeals to the truth-conditions 
of statements about abstract objects being stipulated to coincide with truth-conditions of statements 
about concrete objects. Similarly, there is the proviso that the line of response requires one to take 
Fregean abstractions as implicit definitions. As I go on to discuss in later chapters, it is not clear to 
me either that they should be treated as such or that they need to be; however, let us grant this for 
now to help bring out the force of the response.
53 Hale & Wright (2002), p.119. I have removed illustrative references to the discussion of numerical identity.
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How we know facts about abstract objects neatly builds on how we know that our reference to 
abstract objects is successful. As Hale and Wright point out, we need only know the truth of the 
relevant equivalence captured by an abstraction principle and the truth of certain statements about 
concrete objects to know that certain statements about abstract objects are true. But we can know 
the truth of the relevant abstractions by understanding the meaning of the terms contained within 
them – if they are analytically true by stipulation – and hence there is “no further problem” about 
knowing the  truth  of  statements  about  abstract  objects.  Thus  if  we can  know that  abstractions 
succeed in referring to the abstract objects that they do in fact refer (as is suggested by our reading 
of Fine's discussion of the Context Principle), we have a route to knowledge of facts about those 
abstract objects.
§5: Objections to the Linguistic Turn
Recall  that  we  have  an  argument  for  our  belief  in  abstract  objects  being  justified  that  makes 
essential  use  of  abstraction  principles.  The  idea  is  that  we  have  impredicative  necessary 
equivalences  that  demonstrate  that  the  same  fact  can  be  expressed  with  or  without  (explicit) 
reference to certain classes of objects. From this, we give reasons to think that our acceptance of 
such abstractions justifies our use of the singular terms contained in them as genuinely referring 
terms,  and moreover  justifies our belief  in the existence of their  purported referents.  There are 
therefore three theses open to objection: the thought that abstractions express an important kind of 
necessary equivalence that underwrites the EPT and the OPT, the OPT itself and the EPT itself. I 
will assess each of these in turn.
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§5.1: Abstractions and Equivalence
The attempt to establish the EPT and OPT by appeal to features of abstraction principles will only 
get off the ground once we are clear about the kind of equivalence that abstractions are supposed to 
express. We can say that the LHS and RHS 'state the same fact' or something similar, but this is both 
unnecessarily unclear and leaves unanswered two questions about any further interpretation. The 
first is whether it is plausible to say that abstractions are principles governing 'sameness of fact' 
(however that is cashed out), and the second is whether this 'sameness of fact' will be adequate to 
underwrite the EPT and OPT.
Whilst Dummett54 and Hale55  argue that treating abstractions as stating that the LHS and RHS have 
equivalent  senses or  express  the  same  thought  is  not  consistent  with  the  EPT  and  Frege's 
understanding of the sense of sentences as being composed of the senses of their constituent parts, it 
seems  to  me  extremely  plausible  to  interpret  abstractions  as  making  a  claim about  the  truth-
conditions of the LHS and RHS. The point is supposed to be that for the LHS and RHS to express 
the same thought is to say that there is no epistemic priority between one or the other – to grasp the 
content of the LHS  just is to grasp the content of the RHS and vice versa. However, to say that 
abstractions express an equivalence of truth-conditions seems more fitting in that it allows for one 
side to be epistemically prior to the other without prejudging which side has that priority. There is 
of course the outstanding question of whether the EPT and the OPT have any traction in the cases 
relevant to our discussion, but to press this is just to move on to objecting to the EPT or OPT on 
independent grounds. Thus provided the proponent of the linguistic turn is cautious at this point, 
there is very limited mileage in objecting to this aspect of abstraction principles.
54 Dummett (1991), pp.168-70
55 Hale (1995), pp.192-7
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§5.2: The Ontological Plenitude Thesis
The most obvious line of objection to the OPT is to say that we should take the RHS of abstractions 
to be a better guide to the constitution of the class of objects in which we ought to believe if we 
endorse the abstraction. The idea is that even if the EPT is true, it does not help us to establish the 
OPT. The proper conclusion to draw is not that the LHS has inherited the RHS's status as being 
epistemologically and referentially unproblematic despite it being about abstract objects, but that 
the LHS is epistemologically and referentially unproblematic  only because it is  not really about 
abstract objects at all. All parties can agree that both sides of the abstraction are about the same 
thing, but the claim is that we have reason to think that the surface grammar of the RHS is a better 
guide to our ontological commitments than that of LHS. We have to decide whether this is a case in 
which the surface grammar (of either side of the abstraction) is likely to be misleading, and the 
heart of the objection is that there is an allegedly coherent and convincing explanation of how the 
neo-logicist gets things wrong. As noted in §2, there are plenty of examples in natural language of 
terms that 'look referential' but are not; the objection here is that terms purporting to refer to abstract 
objects can seen as an example of such pseudo-reference, as in the case of 'sakes' or 'whereabouts'. 
Treating them as genuinely referential is motivated only by a desire to make the identity claim of 
the LHS a genuine identity. This does not warrant inflating our ontology.
It seems to me that there is a promising line of response to this kind of objection that draws on the 
Context  Principle  as  a  principle  governing  reference.  Recall  the  slightly  flat-footed  and 
oversimplified view presaged at the end of §4; we have terms that behave referentially, and by the 
Context Principle such terms can be guaranteed reference by the contribution that they make to true 
sentences.  As  such,  if  the  appropriate  sentences  (the  abstractions)  are  in  fact  true  –  and  the 
potentially referring terms actually refer – then we will be justified in believing in the existence of 
the relevant abstract objects in virtue of our justification in believing such relevant sentences.
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The difficulty with this line of response is that using the Context Principle only justifies our using 
the relevant singular terms that stand for abstract objects in the way that we do. However we are not 
yet warranted in drawing the further conclusion that we are justified in believing in abstract objects; 
if some coherent alternative is available, we have not yet done enough. It is a position of this sort 
that  Dummett  endorses,  taking  an  'intermediate'  reading  of  abstraction  and  calling  it  'tolerant 
reductionism'  (in  contrast  to  the 'austere'  reading of the 'intolerant  reductionist').  The intolerant 
reductionist  cannot  endorse  the  Context  Principle  as  a  principle  governing  reference  owing  to 
considerations  discussed  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs,  but  the  tolerant  reductionist  is  not  so 
constrained – he can make such an endorsement but need not be committed to the OPT as a result.
Dummett's claim is that to cast the debate as being between the robust and austere readings is to fail 
to keep separate two distinct aspects of Frege's account of reference: reference as a relation between 
a name and its bearer, and reference as semantic role – as Wright puts it, “the contribution it makes 
to  determining  the  references  (truth-values)  of  complex  expressions  (sentences)  in  which  it 
features.”56 On Dummett's view, to fully determine the reference of a singular term is to say both 
how that term relates to a particular non-linguistic object and how that term relates to other (more 
complex) linguistic expressions. Thus the Context Principle (as a principle governing reference) 
informs our reading of abstractions only inasmuch as it informs our understanding of the purely 
linguistic aspect of the reference of the singular terms of the LHS.
Dummett  does not  want  to make the implausible claim that  these two aspects  of reference are 
independent of one another – indeed, he makes the case that for concrete objects, the two aspects 
are coincident. When reference to concrete objects is in question, there can be no way for a singular 
term to make a contribution to the truth conditions of more complex expressions except by there 
being some external object that has the requisite properties and behaves in the requisite fashion. 
However, Dummett argues that there is a relevant disanalogy with abstract singular terms, and that 
56 Wright (1983), p.66
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as such we cannot justify taking such terms to possess realistic reference.
I do not intend to discuss the details of Dummett's argument to withhold attribution of realistic 
reference to abstract singular terms for two reasons. The first is that even if it is successful, it is left 
open that there could be some other way to justify taking thin and realistic reference of abstract 
singular  terms to  be coincident  (and,  of course,  that  such terms would indeed refer to abstract 
objects). Secondly, this more nuanced line of objection to the OPT is clearly reliant on there being a 
coherent and stable middle ground between the austere and robust readings of abstractions. It seems 
to me that one can follow Hale57 in putting pressure on the plausibility of this necessary condition 
for Dummett's argument to get off the ground.
Hale parses Dummett's objection in terms of 'thin' and 'realistic' reference, where a term has realistic 
reference only if it has an object in the world as its referent and thin reference only if its semantic 
role is to contribute to the truth-conditions of more complex expressions. He goes on to say that “it 
is  an  objection  to  platonism that  directions  can  be  objects  only of  thin  reference  only  if it  is 
contended that objects of realistic reference may be held to exist in some sense in which objects of 
thin reference may not – and for that contention Dummett offers no argument whatsoever.”58 The 
point is clearly supposed to be that we need to have a reason for thinking that a term having thin 
reference could fail to adequately justify a belief that it also has realistic reference, and no such 
reason has been provided.
This  is  undoubtedly the  key issue,  but  first  it  is  helpful  to  get  clear  on the  precise  dialectical 
situation. There is already a standing objection to platonism based on Benacerraf's challenge, and 
Dummett's position is supposed to demonstrate a shortcoming in a particular line of response. His 
distinction between two aspects of reference – one purely semantic, the other a relation between a 
linguistic expression and an external object – is key to this. The difference in these two aspects of 
57 Hale (1995)
58 Ibid., p.205
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reference can and should be granted at  the conceptual level;  the burden of argument is  on the 
platonist to show that even if there is a worthwhile conceptual distinction to be drawn between thin 
and realistic reference, the distinction would disappear at the ontological level. In other words, the 
platonist  must show that thin reference of terms for abstract  objects  is  going to suffice for the 
existential  guarantees  that  the  platonist  requires.  Such  an  argument  would  demonstrate  that 
Dummett's distinction need not be an obstacle to justifying our beliefs in abstract objects, and hence 
that he would not have succeeded in exposing that the current line of response to Benacerraf lacks 
sufficient motivation.
The  question,  then,  is  whether  Hale  has  provided  such  an  argument.  Hale  (as  adumbrated  by 
Wright59) suggests that Dummett's intermediate position can be upheld only if there can be different 
senses of 'exist' – one to correspond to the (realistic) existence of referents of terms with realistic 
reference,  the other to correspond to the (thin) existence of referents of terms with merely thin 
reference. The point is that without such a conceptual distinction, the distinction between the two 
notions of reference will indeed disappear at the ontological level – whilst we will have succeeded 
in  pointing  out  two  distinct  features  of  what  happens  when  a  term  refers,  we  will  not  have 
succeeded  in  showing  that  they  can  be  held  apart.  But  this  is  just  what  is  required  for  the 
intermediate reading of abstractions to stand alone and not collapse into either the austere or robust 
reading.  Hale  notes  that  Dummett  is  (for  good  and  familiar  reasons)  unwilling  to  endorse  a 
distinction between realistic and thin existence, but without such a distinction it is very hard to see 
how the neo-Fregean conclusion – the OPT – can be resisted in this Dummettian way.
59 Wright (1983), p.83
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§5.3: The Epistemic Priority Thesis
Finally,  we have  the  EPT.  Recall  that  this  thesis  is  a  claim that  it  is  sufficient  to  understand 
abstractions  and the  description  of  the  facts  expressed  in  RHS-vocabulary in  order  to  be  able 
recognise the facts as expressed in LHS-vocabulary. Our putative objector is therefore claiming that 
on  the  linguistic  turn,  the  order  of  explanation  is  wrong.  In  order  to  understand  what  makes 
statements about abstract objects true, we must understand something about those abstract objects. 
Thus  an  explanation  of  how  we  know  anything  about  abstract  objects  in  terms  of  senses  of 
statements about those objects is invalidated. However, whilst a position of this sort is very natural, 
it is rarely argued for. Moreover, as Hale and Wright note, it is this idea that is
“what  is  embodied  in  the  Augustinian  conception  of  language  that  is  put  up  for 
rebuttal at the very outset of the  Philosophical Investigations; and the prime spur 
towards the 'naturalist' tendency which finds abstract objects per se problematical is 
the idea, at the heart of the Augustinian conception, that some... causal relationship 
must lie at the roots of all intelligible thought of, and hence reference to objects of a 
particular kind. While this is not the place to enlarge on the relevant points in detail, 
it is by no means an uncommon reading of  Philosophical Investigations to believe 
that the book as a whole accomplishes a compelling critique of this idea.”60
The thought  here  is  that  the  use  of  knowledge of  senses  of  sentences  to  explain  the  sense  of 
expressions is not so outlandish, whilst its contrary is not as compelling as might first be thought. If 
language more generally can be seen to work this way, it should certainly work for each area of 
discourse in which an integration problem arises.
60 Hale and Wright (2002), p.116
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However another (somewhat easier) way to defend the EPT is to argue that it follows from some of 
the less controversial aspects of the discussion of the Context Principle in §4. The EPT is the result 
of an application of the Context Principle to abstractions. If (contrary to the EPT) the LHS were to 
have epistemic priority, then we would have to have some grasp of the objects referred to by the 
singular terms of the LHS prior to our giving the relevant identity conditions embodied by the RHS 
of an abstraction. If this is to be possible, however, we would have to have grasped the sense of 
such terms independent of propositions that are true of them – precisely what is ruled out by an 
endorsement of the Context Principle as a principle governing sense. Thus endorsing the Context 
Principle will give us sufficient grounds for endorsing the EPT.
If this line of argument is cogent, is the legitimacy of the linguistic turn in principle now beyond 
question? There is one further (albeit somewhat desperate) ploy available. The thought is that one 
should accept this neo-Fregean line of argument up to a point, but see the conclusion as a kind of 
reductio ad absurdum. The conclusion, recall, is that one can use abstractions to transfer the status 
of  claims  about  the  RHS as  epistemically  and  referentially  unproblematic  to  claims  about  the 
referents of the terms of the LHS. The proposed response would be to say that we already (from 
Benacerraf's argument) have good reason to think that the objects of the LHS are insurmountably 
epistemically and referentially problematic; given that the heart of the EPT is to say that the LHS 
and RHS have the same epistemic status, we should take it that the RHS is just as problematic as the 
LHS – and that is our reductio. There are no problems referring to or understanding facts about 
particular parallel lines, for instance. As such, we must jettison one of our premises – the OPT, the 
EPT, or that abstractions capture some sort of interesting necessary equivalence.
This kind of response is simply question-begging and misses the point of the linguistic turn entirely. 
It  is  clear  that  the  impossibility  of  resolving  Benacerraf's  dilemma is  a  further  premise  in  the 
foregoing objection but it is a premise that is taken to be sacrosanct for no good reason. Indeed, the 
point of the linguistic turn is to take Benacerraf's challenge seriously but demonstrate that it is not 
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impossible to meet.  There is  nothing contained in the preceding line of argument that  gives us 
independent reason to take the challenge as impossible to meet, and as such it can be rejected.
§6: Conclusion
I have so far defended the view that to take the linguistic turn to resolve Benacerraf's challenge is an 
open epistemic possibility. The fairly minimal (although nonetheless substantial) claim is that no 
prior characterisation of our connection to abstract objects is necessary for knowledge of facts about 
them or  reference  to  them;  instead,  we  can  attain  knowledge  by  understanding  the  senses  of 
appropriate statements in which abstract object terms appear. However, it is not yet clear that there 
are any such appropriate statements. Whilst the neo-Fregean will claim that there is an abstraction 
that will do the job, this raises the issue of which such abstractions are suitable candidates. In the 
following  chapter  I  investigate  whether  what  is  taken  (by  Wright  and  others)  to  be  the  best 
candidate  for solving Benacerraf's  problem with respect  to number,  Hume's  Principle,  is  fit  for 
purpose.
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Chapter 2
The locus classicus for neo-Fregean logicism is Wright (1983), in which he attempts to establish a 
view that consists of two components; one mathematical, one philosophical. The former, technical, 
result has become known as Frege's Theorem – that second-order Dedekind-Peano arithmetic61 is 
equi-interpretable in Fregean second-order logic with what has become known as Hume's Principle
(HP): F G [#F = #G ∀ ∀ ↔ (F ≈ G)] for ≈ := “∃ 1-1 correspondence”
appended as an axiom. The domain of HP is taken to be the class of all Fregean concepts (with 
suitable qualification to be explicated later),  whilst the # operator is a function that is taken by 
Wright to be short for 'the cardinal number of'. The latter, philosophical, project then consists in 
assessing the significance of Frege's Theorem. The main thought here is that HP and second-order 
logic each have a certain epistemological status, and that 'recognisable logical consequence' can 
preserve such a status.
The idea, as noted, is to answer the Benacerrafian challenge by using a strategy based on adopting 
an  abstraction  principle  as  an  axiom.  The  abstraction,  HP,  is  designed  therefore  to  have  two 
epistemological roles that correspond to two parts of Wright's argument. The first is to guarantee 
that we can have knowledge of facts about the referents of the terms of the LHS by understanding 
what it takes for the RHS to be true. It is this part of his argument that I assess in Chapter 1. The 
second is to provide an epistemologically unproblematic foundation for any theory that takes such 
an abstraction as an axiom. Frege's Theorem guarantees that if epistemic status may be transmitted 
across recognisable logical consequence, then arithmetic will have the same epistemic status as that 
of HP.
61 Henceforth I will drop the qualifier 'second-order Dedekind-Peano'.
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It  is worth pausing at this point to make a brief digression. As the foregoing remarks indicate, 
Wright's  neo-logicism  is  designed  to  take  on  Benacerraf's  challenge  entirely  at  the  level  of 
addressing the epistemological issues that it raises. Another form of neo-logicism, championed by 
(for  instance)  Tennant62 and Rumfitt63 seeks to  attack on both fronts  by changing the semantic 
requirements and solving a consequently different set of epistemological problems. The idea is to 
work in a free logic rather than standard second-order logic; the key difference is that on a free 
logic, singular terms do not need to refer. The difficulty for a theorist working in such a logic, then, 
is not to give an account of how we can justify thinking that our terms refer but how we justify a 
further auxiliary principle that tells us when a singular term refers and when it is an empty name.
There are some interesting features of any neo-logicist system governed by a free logic, of which I 
will note three. The first is that for Wright, whether or not this kind of approach is correct, it is 
certainly overly tentative; in his view there is no need to allow for the possibility (or even the 
coherence) of numerical terms failing to refer. Secondly, the line of argument that I will advance in 
§2 that makes essential use of counterexamples to HP would be relatively ineffectual; such cases 
could only (at  most)  be purported counterexamples to  the conjunction of  HP and the auxiliary 
principle  governing  reference  of  singular  terms,  and  as  such  HP can  be  maintained  in  its  full 
generality (provided that one accommodates the potential problem case by making a change to the 
auxiliary  principle).  Thirdly,  giving  an  assessment  of  the  epistemic  status  of  the  non-logical 
principles of a neo-logicist programme would no longer be limited to an assessment of particular 
abstractions  –  instead,  we  would  have  to  assess  the  status  of  the  auxiliary  principles  such  as 
Tennant's Ratchet Principle or Rumfitt's suggested improvement. It seems to me that there is plenty 
to say on the subject of abstractions, and a discussion of auxiliary existence principles within a free 
logic should be treated as part of a separate project that need not concern us here. Thus for reasons 
of space, I will leave this kind of approach to one side.
62 See Tennant (1987), (1997)
63 See Rumfitt (1999), (2001)
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To return to the issue at hand – assessing the epistemic status of HP and its consequences – let us 
give a more regimented reconstruction of Wright's argument:
1. Frege's Theorem: Arithmetic is a (recognisable) second-order logical consequence of HP.
2. If HP is analytically true, its recognisable logical consequences are analytically true.
3. HP is analytically true.
4. Therefore, arithmetic is analytically true.
This  argument  is  clearly valid.  (1) is  a  mathematical  theorem that  is  not open to  doubt.  (2) is 
dependent on the notion of analyticity in play – if it is sufficiently epistemologically loaded then (2) 
may come out as trivially true, whereas if it is is strongly metaphysical then (2) may be far from 
obvious64. Despite this, let us for the moment grant (2) and focus in this chapter on assessing (3) – 
the claim that HP is analytic. 
In  this  chapter  I  will  evaluate  Wright's  argument  for  the  analyticity  of  HP,  and consider  what 
epistemological significance such a result would have. I then discuss some (at least prima facie) 
counterexamples  to  HP,  before  exploring  how  HP might  be  modified  to  accommodate  these 
troublesome cases.
§1: Wright's Argument for Analyticity
Wright's argument for the analyticity of HP has a number of strands to it; some positive, others 
more defensive. The reason for this is partly historical, as he investigates why Frege did not, upon 
the discovery of the inconsistency of BLV, simply adopt HP as an additional axiom. Frege's reason 
64 And, indeed, may give rise to an epistemologically deficient conclusion!
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was an inability to solve the Julius Caesar problem – that we cannot (merely thanks to our definition 
of number) resolve the truth of mixed identity statements. Wright takes it that this is one of the 
“several  specific  grounds  on  which  it  might  be  held  that  HP cannot  function  as...  an  implicit 
definition”65,  and  that  “much  of  the  defensive  work  required  of  the  neo-Fregean...  consists  in 
dealing with doubts and objections on this score.”66 However, I will set aside such a defensive task 
in order to concentrate on a more positive line of argument – that Fregean abstractions (and HP in 
particular) can have an epistemic status accorded to informative definitions.
Wright's argument has both a general and a more specific aspect to it. He notes that abstractions are 
being used as implicit, non-eliminative definitions of terms. He goes on to argue that the mere fact 
that  we  cannot  guarantee  being  able  to  use  such  definitions  to  eliminate  all  instances  of  the 
definienda need not count against them. To move to the specific strand, he argues further that if the 
method of implicit definitions is acceptable then Fregean abstractions (that satisfy certain further 
constraints – the most obvious one being consistency) are often likely candidates for acceptable 
principles.
The relevant point for my discussion is the role of abstractions as implicit definitions. The key 
passage for Wright's framing of the issue goes as follows:
“[HP] is inadequate as a definition in the purest sense since it fails to provide the 
eliminative  facility  which  any genuine  definition  must...  Nevertheless  statements 
containing  ineliminable  occurrences  of  arithmetical  vocabulary  can  still  be 
apprehended  as  logical  truths  if  they  can  be  shown  to  follow  logically  from 
statements which do possess purely logical transcriptions and which are theorems of 
higher-order logic.”67
65 Hale & Wright (2001), p.14
66 Loc. cit.
67 Wright (1983), p.139
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He notes further that what is lacking is an 'explanation in purely logical terms' of those ineleminable 
occurrences of arithmetical vocabulary. He requires a principle that gives, via Frege's Theorem, a 
guarantee that arithmetic is “nothing other than a logical consequence of the very explanation of 
cardinal number itself.”68 The idea, then, is to use HP as something akin to an informative definition 
of some notion that is already in our language.
At this point it should be noted that Wright does not always seem to have this kind of aim in mind. 
For instance, he writes that
“An abstraction principle is not an attempt to state an antecedently determinate truth. 
It is intended, rather, to fix a new concept by determining the truth-conditions of 
certain statements involving it.”69
On this kind of reading of abstractions, they come out true by stipulation. As such, there is nothing 
in principle to constrain our stipulations; but this is clearly in tension with the idea of explaining the 
notion  of  cardinal  number.  If,  as  Wright  periodically  professes,  we  are  looking  to  give  an 
explanation  of  cardinal  number,  there  must  be  some  phenomenon  or  concept  that  requires 
explanation and that can only be our current concept of cardinality. As such we are constrained by 
our actual concept of cardinality in giving truth conditions for a statement governing identity of 
cardinal  numbers.  This  point  is  implicit  in  the  debate  between  Wright  and  Boolos  about  the 
analyticity of HP where Boolos quotes Wright as pointing the inadequacy of calling a principle 
analytic when “there is no prior, no intuitively entrenched notion, no notion given independently, 
which [our candidate principle] is analytic of.”70
Thus Wright seems to have in mind two distinct aims that he does not always manage to hold apart. 
68 Ibid., p.154
69 Wright (1997), p.281
70 Boolos (1997), p.312
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As indicated both above and in the introduction, it seems as though only the latter, explanatory, 
target can be the appropriate one – Wright is not free to explain our knowledge of arithmetic and 
our referential success in our use of arithmetical terms by hijacking our concept of cardinality and 
making it fit  his new, stipulated,  principle.  Instead any principle that  is supposed to define our 
concept of cardinal number must conform to the use of that very concept. As such, we should not 
read Wright as attempting to introduce, by way of a stipulative definition of a new term, a new 
notion  into  our  language.  Instead  he  must  be  seen  as  attempting,  in  some  sense,  to  give  a 
retrospective definition  of  cardinal  number  –  a  sharpening  of  a  notion  that  is  already  well-
entrenched. It seems that this captures both the explanatory aspect and the definitional aspect of 
what Wright requires of HP.
Where, then, is the link with analyticity? If such a retrospective definition is to count as analytic, 
Wright needs to be more explicit about what exactly is encompassed by analyticity. He concedes 
that on a Fregean construal of analyticity, HP will not come out as analytic. This is because it is not 
a truth of logic nor is it an explicit, eliminative definition. However, he points out that this construal 
is too narrow, as it excludes prima facie analytic truths (such as “whatever is yellow is extended”); 
what he requires is a notion that is Fregean in spirit but somewhat broader. He claims that such a 
notion exists, and moreover is the appropriate one by which HP should be judged. He argues by 
analogy to that notion governing the analyticity of statements that link the logical connectives with 
their rules of inference. For instance, he takes it that “the meanings of the logical constants should 
be regarded as implicitly defined by the stipulation of the usual rules for their introduction and 
elimination in inferential contexts.”71 He calls such stipulations determinative of the concepts that 
they are supposed to explain, and notes that abstractions such as HP could count as analytic on a 
similar model.
It is worth distinguishing two claims that the above reconstruction of Wright brings out. The first is 
71 Hale & Wright (2000), pp.117-8. See also Hale & Wright (2001), pp.12-4.
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a conjunction of two conditional claims; if HP is true, then it is analytically true and if it is false, it 
is analytically false. The second is that HP is true (and hence analytically true). I will call statements 
that if true are analytically true and if false are analytically false  quasi-analytic. Both of Wright's 
claims here are doubted by Boolos72, who argues that on natural construals of analytic statements 
there is insufficient reason to think that HP could count as one of them. He further argues that if 
some other notion of analyticity were right, then HP would still be inadequate as it is in fact false. 
Thus HP is not quasi-analytic nor is it true, whilst the reason for thinking that it is analytic is that 
there are (analytic) truths closely related to it.
My argument will be related but will have a different focus inasmuch as I grant the quasi-analyticity 
of HP but demonstrate that it is false. I then consider what would be involved in any attempt to 
exorcise the counterexamples to HP to yield an abstraction HP* – a restricted version of HP that is 
true – and ask whether any such principle could be analytic. My contention is that no restriction of 
HP adequate for Wright's purposes can be quasi-analytic, and hence Wright's proposal cannot be 
easily fixed.
The foregoing shows that I seek to establish a slightly different conclusion to that of Boolos, as he 
does not accept even the quasi-analyticity of HP. I grant that it is quasi-analytic but show that none 
of its relevant restrictions can be. However, my argument is not just a dialectical one – it is not 
simply asking for an account of analyticity and an example of HP* before showing that they do not 
combine in the required way. My point is that  any reasonable construal of analyticity on which 
abstractions could count as analytic and any possible HP* will not mesh together. Having said this, 
such a contention is only relevant if HP is quasi-analytic  and false. We have quasi-analyticity by 
hypothesis, and so I now turn to a discussion of purported counterexamples to HP.
72 Boolos (1997)
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§2: Counterexamples to Hume's Principle
Whilst the Russellian reasoning that makes Frege's Basic Law V unacceptable is well-known, there 
is a strong inclination to think (as Frege and Wright did) that HP is true as well as consistent. 
However, HP does not seem to hold for all concepts (or even all concepts for which it is 'supposed 
to'  hold).  The  purported  counterexamples  to  HP are  of  the  form  of  a  counterexample  to  its 
consequence that all concepts have a unique cardinal number. The concepts that give rise to such 
cases  can be split  into  three categories.  The first  are  vague predicates,  a class that  for current 
purposes  I  can and will  treat  as  contained  within the second class  of  semantically paradoxical 
predicates. The third are indefinitely extensible concepts, a notion to be explicated later.
§2.1: Paradoxical Predicates
I will take a predicate to be vague only if it has fuzzy borders of extension, it is subject to borderline 
cases, and it is vulnerable to Sorites-like reasoning73. The relevant consideration here is that of there 
being no clearly-defined extension; if it is indeterminate whether or not something is F, then F will 
have an indeterminate extension. As such, there will be no determinate unique cardinal number that 
is the number of Fs. I will not attempt to treat such predicates separately; I will instead use the fact 
that they give rise to the Sorites Paradox74 in order to put vague predicates in the same category as 
those that lead to alternative semantic paradoxes as outlined below.
73 All of these conditions should be understood as qualified by 'prima facie'.
74 It is of course possible to query this assumption. Two obvious ways to do so would be to reject classical two-valued 
logic or to endorse something like Williamson's epistemism. However, to go down the former route would be 
completely antithetical to a Fregean philosophy of mathematics. An assessment of the latter lies beyond the scope of 
this thesis; but it is clear that if it is a commitment of a neo-Fregean treatment of arithmetic to be unable to remain 
neutral on the correct treatment of vague predicates, this is to the neo-Fregean's detriment.
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A well-known example of a predicate that gives rise to a semantic paradox is 'is a heterological 
adjective of English*', where English* is English with the word 'heterological' appended to it. A 
word  is  heterological  iff  it  does  not  truly  describe  itself  –  for  example,  'monosyllabic'  is 
heterological  as  the  word  itself  is  not  monosyllabic.  The  problem  arises  when  one  considers 
whether or not 'heterological' is a heterological adjective of English*. If it is, then it is heterological 
and hence does not truly describe itself. Thus heterological is not heterological. But if heterological 
is  not a heterological  adjective of English*,  and hence does not truly describe itself,  then it  is 
heterological – a contradiction. Thus 'is a heterological adjective of English*' cannot have a definite 
extension containing all and only those adjectives that are heterological, and thus such a concept 
certainly cannot have a unique cardinal number.
There is a comparable argument using 'heterological' to construct disjunctive predicates. Take any 
controversial proposition (Wright's75 example is “the universe is finite”), and take the predicate 'is 
heterological  or  “the  universe  is  finite”  is  true'.  By  parallel  reasoning,  considerations  about 
vocabulary leads to  a  proof  that  the universe is  finite  (as accepting the other  disjunct  leads to 
contradiction). If such armchair astronomy is to be ruled out, we must find a way to exorcise such 
predicates.
I want to suggest that the moral to draw from the above cases is not that HP is defective, but that 
our choice of concept with which to test (so to speak) HP is not a good one. Another way of looking 
at the alleged difficulty is to say that we take HP and 'plug in' various predicates, whereupon we 
discover that we get apparently false instantiations. In such a case, however, there are two possible 
diagnoses: that there is something wrong with the principle, or that there is something wrong with 
the predicates. Here there is a great temptation to say the latter. Something that might indicate that 
this is the way to go is that these predicates give rise to semantic paradoxes when used in more 
familiar settings – for example, using disjunctive predicates to generate a counterexample to HP is a 
75 Wright (1997), p.286
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close analogy of Curry's paradox. There is no readily available and uncontroversial way to resolve 
these semantic paradoxes, and as such we should not automatically take the fact that our system has 
not resolved these paradoxes – problems that our system is not designed to solve – to count against 
it.  The  objection  is  that  adopting  this  method  of  concept  formation  leads  to  difficulties  when 
considering a class of predicates that give rise to semantic paradoxes. The response is that this fact 
can only be used to show that abstraction principles are no better than our current, well-entrenched 
methods. Unless our current methods are held to be themselves defective, it does not follow just 
from these paradoxical or vague predicates that our abstraction is similarly defective.
This kind of argument seems to be what Wright is getting at when he writes that
“We should not,  presumably,  conclude that the whole idea that properties can be 
defined by the stipulation of satisfaction conditions  is  misbegotten.  Rather,  some 
kind of restriction is warranted. Nor, crucially, pending such a restriction, should we 
suspend judgement about what appears to be perfectly innocent examples of such a 
procedure.  The sensible response is  rather  that  there is  a  distinction to  be drawn 
which we are, perhaps, not clear how exactly to draw but which, once drawn, will 
safeguard  the  vast  majority  of  cases  where  we  fix  a  property  by  stipulating 
satisfaction conditions.”76
However, it is not clear that it is sufficient to endorse the conditional: if HP is indeed a “perfectly 
innocent example”, then what Wright says seems right. The point is that we have some suspicious 
predicates falsifying our principle; Wright's claim is only a defence of the kind of principle involved 
rather than the individual principle itself. 
However, if Frege's Theorem is going to play the role of transmitting analyticity across second-
76 Ibid, p.288
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order consequence, it  had better be based on a  true abstraction. Thus whilst Wright claims that 
drawing  the  relevant  distinction  is  solely  “in  the  interest  of  clarity  and...  intellectual  good 
housekeeping”77, it is not clear that this is quite fair to his objector. There is work to be done here, 
and  it  is  perhaps  rather  more  urgent  than  Wright  would  have  us  believe;  it  is  also,  however, 
somewhat less urgent than first appearances might suggest.
§2.2: Indefinitely Extensible Predicates
A different category of predicates include more interesting attempts to show that HP is false. Take 
the concept 'is self-identical'. HP implies that there is such a number as #[x: x=x], something Wright 
calls “anti-zero.” By definition of ≤, anti-zero is the number that is greater than any other number. 
The worry now is whether or not there is such a number. Both intuitively and according to ZF set 
theory, there is no such cardinal of all the things (or even sets) that there are. Thus Frege arithmetic 
is incompatible with ZF and, moreover, if HP is analytically true then ZF is analytically false.
There is a similar line of reasoning that works with respect to the concept 'set' or 'ordinal' – those 
that are too big. These are, in Dummett's terminology,  indefinitely extensible. The extensions of 
such concepts are characterised by Wright as follows:
“a totality of such a sort that any attempt to view it as a determinate collection of 
objects  will  merely  subserve  the  specification  of  new  objects  which  ought, 
intuitively, to lie within the totality but cannot, on pain of contradiction, be supposed 
to do so.”78,79
77 Loc. cit.
78 Wright (1998), p.316
79 This is importantly different from Dummett's own characterisation. He writes that “No definite totality comprises 
everything intuitively recognisable as an ordinal number, where a definite totality is one quantification over which 
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To take the case of 'ordinal', we obtain a counterexample to HP because to allow that there is such a 
thing as the number of all ordinals is incompatible with the conclusion of the Burali-Forti Paradox – 
that there is no set of all ordinals. Similarly, by Cantor's Paradox, there can be no number of all sets 
as there is no set of all sets. Thus instances of HP of such indefinitely extensible concepts gives a 
result that is incompatible with any acceptable set theories; as such, we have a class of concepts that 
give counterexamples to HP.
Wright notes that this need not be a reason to think that HP is worthless as an implicit definition. 
Rather than a wholesale rejection of HP, what is needed is a principled restriction to rule out these 
problem cases.  These  counterexamples  show not  that  HP is  not  definitional  of  the  concept  of 
cardinal number, but that it is only a partial definition. Moreover, we can bolster the case for HP by 
noting that it is in some sense exceptional instances that seem to give rise to problems. However, if 
we accept that HP is not a complete definition, there are no longer any grounds for saying that the 
whole of arithmetic can be interpreted in an analytic theory.80 I will return to this point later, but for 
now it is enough to consider that if HP must be restricted in an ad hoc way in order to give rise to a 
true theory in which arithmetic can be interpreted, it is going to come out as non-analytic.
The key qualifier, of course, in the above rendering of the objection to Wright's position is “ad hoc.” 
Wright can accept the objection as it stands, but deny that a restriction of HP (HP*) need be ad hoc. 
For example, it does not seem ad hoc to restrict the domain of concepts to only  sortal  concepts. 
Wright explicates the notion thus:
always yields a statement determinately true or false. For a totality to be definite in this sense, we must have a clear 
grasp of what it comprises: but, if we have a clear grasp of any totality of ordinals, we thereby have a conception of 
what is intuitively an ordinal number greater than any member of that totality. Any definite totality of ordinals must 
therefore be so circumscribed as to forswear comprehensiveness, renouncing any claim to cover all that we might 
intuitively recognise as being an ordinal.” (1991, p.316). On this understanding, it is open to regard totalities such as 
the natural numbers as indefinitely extensible, even though quantification over the natural numbers need not lead to 
contradiction. As such, Dummett's conception is broader than Wright's but it is Wright's that contains the relevant 
problem cases.
80 Whilst Boolos believes that even if HP were true it would not yield the desired result, this is not necessary for the 
point to go through.
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“[T]he usual intuitive understanding is that a sortal concept is one associated both 
with a criterion of application – a distinction between the things to which it applies 
and those to which it doesn't – and a criterion of identity: some principle determining 
the truth-values of contexts of the form “X is the same F as Y.”... [I]n general, purely 
qualitative predicates, predicates of constitution, and attributive adjectives – although 
syntactically  admissible  substituends  for  occurrences  of  the  predicate  letters  in  
higher-order logic – are not [sortal concepts].81”
On such a rendering of sortal concepts, Wright provides an ingenious test as to whether or not a 
concept should count as sortal. He observes that non-sortal concepts, when conjoined with a sortal 
concept, give a conjunctive sortal concept. As such, if a non-sortal concept is conjoined with a 
concept of which it is not known whether or not it is sortal, it will be sortal only if the conjunctive 
concept is. For example, 'is brown' is non-sortal whilst 'is a horse' is sortal – as such, 'is a brown 
horse' is sortal. By these lights, 'is self-identical' is non-sortal; for any non-sortal concept, such as 
'brown',  the  conjunctive  concept  'brown  and  self-identical'  is  equivalent  to  'brown'  which,  ex 
hypothesi, is non-sortal. Thus 'is self-identical' is non-sortal, and hence not admissible to the domain 
of concepts to which HP applies.
There are two issues relating to Wright's characterisation and treatment of sortal concepts that I 
wish to bracket. Firstly, it is not at all clear whether or not Wright's rendering of a sortal concept 
coheres with his claim that HP is supposed to characterise a sortal concept of 'natural number'. 
Secondly,  why should HP need to have a sortal concept as both input and output, so to speak? 
Wright is attempting to develop Frege's view that numbers are numbers of concepts and is clearly 
claiming that numbers are numbers of sortal concepts, where “a concept is sortal if to instantiate it 
is to exemplify a certain general kind of object … which the world contains.”82 Indeed, the bulk of 
his argument is to say that 'natural number' is one such sortal concept. It seems slightly strange and 
81 Wright (1998), p.315
82 Wright (1983), p.2
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restrictive to say that our principle of numerical identity should apply only to kinds of things, as the 
implication is that cardinality is a property only of such kinds of things. Nevertheless, it seems that 
we can grant that Wright has a coherent, consistent and plausible view of sortal concepts without 
our argument losing any of its bite.
The key point here is that Wright's appeal to such a view of sortal concepts as part of his argument 
to exorcise anti-zero simply does not work for all indefinitely extensible concepts. The concept of 
an  ordinal,  for  instance,  should  surely count  as  a  sortal  concept.  We have  a  clear  criterion  of 
application – x is an ordinal iff x is a transitive set with a well-ordering membership relation – and a 
clear criterion of identity – x is  the same ordinal as y iff  x and y are ordinals and there is an 
isomorphism between x and y. If one wishes to exclude it as non-sortal because there is no number 
of all ordinals, by the Burali-Forti Paradox, this is to beg a question that ought not to be begged. It 
seems clear that 'ordinal' has hallmarks of a sortal concept – if it is not to count as sortal, then that 
fact must be explained. My contention will be that once one undertakes such an explanatory project, 
the  kind  of  justification  of  excluding  such predicates  from the  domain  over  which  HP admits 
quantification is going to invalidate claims that HP could count as a conceptual truth. I will return to 
this issue at a later stage, noting for now only that we have prima facie counterexamples and that 
there are alternative ways of attempting to resolve the difficulties raised by such examples.
§3: Status of Restrictions of Hume's Principle
A line of argument suggesting that HP cannot be analytic just because it is false can have any real 
power only if it is possible to demonstrate why some kind of restriction of an abstraction to give a 
true principle is not going to preserve pseudo-analyticity (and hence be analytic). This seems at first 
to be fairly plausible. In order to see this clearly, it is helpful to summarise the state of play so far. 
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We are granting that analyticity transmits across second-order logical consequence as demanded by 
(2). We are also conceding that it is an epistemological notion, as otherwise the conclusion that 
arithmetic is analytic does not help us resolve Benacerraf's challenge. Wright's substantive claim is 
that HP is analytic on such an understanding, but it turns out that HP is false if unrestricted. This 
suggests that the next step ought to be to refine HP to find a principled, non-ad hoc restriction such 
that it is true. But on this kind of approach it appears that HP is treated more like an empirical, 
inductive generalisation than any kind of conceptual truth. We refine the domain over which HP 
admits  quantification in order to exclude problematic cases,  but this is  not going to help us to 
simply 'see' that there are no counterexamples just from understanding what is said by any candidate 
HP*. This seems to be a minimal requirement of an analytic truth,  and hence HP* will  not be 
analytic.
The response is to say that whilst our  method of refining HP might resemble a refinement of an 
inductive generalisation, that resemblance alone is not sufficient to yield the result that HP* is non-
analytic.  What  we  are  doing  in  making  such  refinements  is  paralleled  by  refinements  in  our 
understanding of the HP. It is not that we are changing what HP is saying; instead we are making it 
clear what the proper content of HP is. This kind of claim is supposed to be independently plausible 
on the grounds that such an explanation works in allegedly analogous cases. For example, take a 
general statement that is false, such as 'all men are unmarried.' We now alter this to 'all bachelors are 
unmarried' which gives an analytically true statement. Thus we have an example of a change in 
truth value that arises from a restriction of a general statement, and the latter (restricted) statement 
is analytic. Why should the same not be true of HP and its restrictions?
The first thing to point out at this juncture is that my argument only need work for abstractions – 
necessary equivalences that have a certain syntactic form. Indeed, it could be even less general than 
this, as I require only that it is a feature of HP to prevent Wright's argument from going through. I 
will therefore use either a general abstraction or HP, depending on the generality of my point at each 
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stage of the argument and for the purposes of clarity. However, the thought here is that what is true 
of statements in general need not hold for abstractions, as abstractions have certain features that 
may allow for restrictions only at some epistemological cost.
Despite this, there is a deeper issue here that is worth bringing out. Something that the 'all men are 
married'  vs 'all  bachelors are  unmarried'  example does not make explicit  is  how the restriction 
occurs. There are two options in such a case; either we change the antecedent of the conditional, or 
we restrict the domain of quantification. This can be made clear by the following formalisations:
'All men are unmarried' iff x (Mx ∀ → Ux)
'All bachelors are unmarried' iff x (Mx ∀ → Ux), where  ranges over all and only bachelors∀
'All bachelors are unmarried' iff x (Bx ∀ → Ux)
Thus either we change our domain such that we exclude potential counterexamples, or we make the 
antecedent of our conditional more demanding. There is a similar taxonomy of restrictions that can 
be used in the case of abstractions. Recall our general abstraction:
F G [ΦF = ΦG ∀ ∀ ↔ (F ≈ G)]
We have a  number of  different  options  here,  each of  which I  will  discuss  in  turn.  One might 
constrain the domain of quantification, change the abstractive relation in such a way as to allow the 
RHS to be satisfied by some other state of affairs, alter the abstraction so that it is the consequent of 
some conditional  with an existential  clause in  the antecedent,  or  bring in  additional  theoretical 
commitments about our treatment of indeterminacy. A fifth and final option that can be quickly 
dismissed is to construe the functional expression as non-total;  however,  treating the functional 
operator on the LHS as non-total is impossible for Wright, as the proof of Frege's Theorem depends 
on the use of HP as a total function to guarantee that every natural number has a successor. As such, 
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we cannot have grounds that derive from the status of HP for thinking arithmetic analytic if HP is 
not interpreted as a total function.
Of our four options to be considered below, we have it that the first option is a way to exclude the 
counterexamples whilst the final three are ways to allow for them. I will argue that whilst each way 
has its own more specific defects, there is a common flaw running through each; the kinds of extra 
theoretical commitments incurred in changing HP (a false general principle) to HP* (a true general 
principle) are not conducive to allowing HP* to be analytic.
§3.1: Domain Restriction
Our first option, then, is to restrict the domain to exclude certain concepts. We can understand this 
approach  by  way of  an  illustration;  let  us  consider  the  relationship  between  HP and  Cantor's 
Principle (CP). CP can be seen as a restricted form of HP in which the domain of quantification is 
restricted. CP states that
(CP): F G [#F = #G ∀ ∀ ↔ f: F ∃ ↔ G (i.e. f is a bijection between F and G)]
Where (crucially) F and G are sets. CP therefore states that cardinality is a property of sets, rather 
than of concepts. Thus the domain of quantification is restricted to a subset of that required by the 
unrestricted HP.
Leaving aside strict nominalist views, we can take it that CP is uncontroversially true; neither the 
semantic nor class paradoxes pose any problems for CP. As such CP is a truth of the same form as 
and in the same neck of the woods as HP. However,  my point is  that  the logicist  cannot avail 
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himself  of  CP  rather  than  the  more  controversial  HP  as  to  do  so  would  undermine  the 
epistemological  aims of his  programme.  This is  because the abstraction is  not a  purely logical 
abstraction; the explanation of the # operator is given in terms of relations between sets, rather than 
the  intentionally  individuated  Fregean  concepts.  Thus  if  we  take  CP  rather  than  HP as  our 
foundational principle, it must be that an understanding of the notion of a set is epistemically prior 
to any understanding of arithmetic. As such the relevant variant of Wright's premise (2) secures only 
that arithmetic has the same epistemic status as that of set theory.
However, there is reason to think that CP is not  analytically true. There are two aspects to this 
worry,  the first of which is dialectic.  Absent some independent reason to think that CP is non-
analytic, one way to assess it would be to consider whether its logical consequences are analytic; if 
it has clearly non-analytic consequences, then by Wright's premise (2) the original principle had 
better not count as analytic. We should take it that reasoning using modus tollens gives us a more 
accurate assessment of analyticity than using modus ponens – to use the latter is to beg the question 
against the opponent of the analyticity of CP.83
But  are  there  any  independent  reasons  to  think  either  that  CP is  analytic  or  that  any  of  its 
consequences are not? It seems to me that there are two important points here. The first is that we 
lack a clear criterion of application for the predicate 'is a set',  and it  is a question that is only 
partially settled by adopting particular set theoretic axioms. This is going to be enough to render CP 
non-analytic. One reason that we can take 'bachelors are unmarried men' to be analytic is that there 
is no further question about the criteria of identity or of application of 'bachelor' once the relevant 
criteria are settled for 'man' and 'unmarried'.84 In contrast this is not the case with respect to 'set'; the 
axiom of extensionality settles the question of identity, but the question of application remains open. 
One of the tasks of set theory is to attempt to settle this question, but that is part of set theory rather 
83 This kind of reasoning parallels Boolos (1997), p.308
84 Here I am being deliberately ambiguous between a metaphysical and epistemological reading of 'settled'; the current 
point does not depend on which reading is thought to be appropriate.
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than any part of logic or conceptual analysis. As such, the logicist cannot establish the analyticity of 
arithmetic by this kind of modification of Wright's argument.
The second issue is that Wright, following Frege, is seeking to establish a version of logicism about 
arithmetic  that  depends  on  treating  cardinality  as  a  property  of  concepts  and  not  of  sets.  If 
cardinality were a property of sets (and could be taken to be a property of concepts only because of 
some connection between sets and the extension of those concepts), then it seems as though it could 
no longer be analytic unless one takes set theory more generally to be analytic. But to take set 
theory to be analytic seems to beg a number of important questions, and would entail a conclusion 
far stronger than the (already slightly implausibly strong) neo-logicism under scrutiny. Thus to treat 
cardinality as a property of sets may or may not be correct, but it is not an option for the neo-
logicist.
To return to HP, there is already one relevant restriction place – a restriction to sortal concepts – but 
the question is whether this can be taken further in a principled way. One possibility is to do so with 
respect to indefinitely extensible concepts that, as noted above, are putative counterexamples to HP. 
It seems as though this is what Wright is tentatively suggesting when he writes
“[i]f there's anything at all in the notion of an indefinitely extensible totality … one 
principled restriction on HP will surely be that F and G not be associated with such 
totalities.”85
And, later:
“The Restriction Problem [is] how best to restrict the range of concepts to which the 
cardinality operator  is  to  apply if  the generation is  to  be avoided of  prima facie 
85 Wright (1998), p.316
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'rogue' numbers like anti-zero, ... the number of sets, the number of ordinals, and so 
on. It seems reasonable to expect that a well-motivated restriction will have to build 
on characterisations both of sortality and indefinite extensibility.”86
In  the  former  quotation  there  is  no  argument  offered  for  the  key  qualifications  “surely”  and 
“principled.” In the latter, he moots only that it seems reasonable that such qualifications will apply 
to restricted forms of HP. However, whilst we do not want to dispute his claim that only sortal 
concepts are appropriate for the domain of HP, there is nothing in what Wright says to persuade us 
that indefinitely extensible concepts should be treated in the same way.
Having said this, it seems to me that we can go further; we may object not just to Wright's treatment 
of indefinitely extensible concepts but more generally to the kind of illegitimate concept-mongering 
in play.  Recall from §1 that Wright proposes two possible ways in which abstractions could be 
analytic; either analytically true by stipulation or analytically true by correctly characterising an 
antecedently understood concept. We saw that it is the latter that is the proper target for an account 
of the analyticity of an abstraction. However, even if we were to say that abstractions could be used 
“to fix a new concept by determining the truth-conditions of certain statements involving it”87, the 
kinds of principles with a restricted domain that have been under scrutiny would not obviously 
count as analytic.
It seems as though in order to “fix a new concept,” we take our domain and come up with some 
suitable equivalence relation on that domain. We then introduce an expression for our new concept 
into the LHS of our abstraction and state what it must be for the referents of the terms of the LHS to 
be the same, stated in terms of a biconditional and our equivalence relation. In the case of DE, then, 
we take as our domain 'lines'88, we take an equivalence relation 'is parallel to', and introduce our 
86 Hale &Wright (2001), p.427
87 Wright (1997), p.281
88 Here I ignore any issues as to whether only actual or possible inscriptions are permissible.
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new functional operator 'the direction of', which has as its output the abstract objects 'directions'. If 
this definition is shown to be faulty in some way, it is surely not adequate to change the domain; 
what we are trying to do is define a concept on that particular domain, not on some other domain. If 
such a restriction were permissible, it seems that we could at best get a partial definition of our 
functional expression. 
In the case of HP, it seems as though it is precisely this kind of situation that confronts us. The class 
of indefinitely extensible predicates cannot, without strong supplementary arguments, be excluded 
from the domain without threatening the comprehensiveness of our attempted definition. But if HP 
is only a partial definition of the cardinality operator, then (as Wright notes89) we cannot guarantee 
the kind of understanding of arithmetic that  the neo-logicist  programme requires.  Thus more is 
required from the neo-logicist if these counterexamples are to be excluded in some principled way.
§3.2: Changes to Abstractive Relations
Let us move now to our second possibility – changing the abstractive relation. The main way in 
which one might do this is to make the equivalence relation disjunctive. A good example of this is 
Boolos' consistent variant of BLV, which he calls VE ('V enlightened'):
(VE): F G [{x:Fx} = {x:Gx} ∀ ∀ ↔ [(F is too big & G is too big) ˅ x (Fx ∀ ↔ Gx)]]
Now the reasoning that leads to Russell's paradox no longer gives rise to a contradiction, but merely 
a  proof  that  the relevant  concepts  are  'too big',  where  a  concept  is  too big  iff  its  extension is 
equinumerous with the universe.
89 Ibid., p.279
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Wright90 and Boolos91 briefly attempt to develop a system that they dub SOLVE – Second-Order-
Logic and VE. Wright, for one, is hesitant to endorse this kind of approach as it is not automatic that 
these sorts of principles give as strong a mathematical result as Frege's Theorem. SOLVE is not as 
powerful a system as FA2 and is not equi-interpretable with it. However, systems based on such 
abstractions could, if those abstractions were to count as analytic, still be used to vindicate some 
sort of partial logicism – at least some important aspects of number theory could conceivably come 
out as analytic. As such, an investigation into the epistemic status of these principles is worthwhile.
There are two worries with taking these refined abstractions to be analytic. The first is to note that 
this  approach does not seem to exorcise the semantically paradoxical counterexamples but only 
those that generate class paradoxes. However, this objection need not be decisive – we only have 
one example of an altered abstraction above, and for all that has been said so far there is nothing in  
principle to prevent us finding a suitable equivalence relation that can generate an abstraction that is 
not subject to the same kind of counterexample. I will not press this further, as it seems to me that 
there is a deeper worry for Wright or Boolos.
The initial attraction of this line of response is supposed to be that we are able to include, rather 
than exclude, potential counterexamples. We have a general principle that, on reflection, appears to 
be not as general as we took it to be. We have two concepts linked together – identity of cardinal 
number and equinumerosity – and have found that we cannot say that this link holds universally. 
The proposed solution of changing the abstraction relation is to say that it is not those two concepts 
that are linked, but two related ones; identity of cardinal number and some disjunctive concept. As 
such we can keep the domain of quantification the same, but show that what holds true in that 
domain with respect to our troublesome functional operator is not what we thought.
According  to  such  a  response,  then,  the  moral  to  be  drawn  from  the  problematic  cases  of 
90 Ibid, p.302
91 Boolos (1987)
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indefinitely extensible concepts is that such concepts do in fact have cardinal numbers belonging to 
them – it is just that we need a broader notion of cardinality. This broader notion can be given by 
some appropriate (if somewhat ad hoc) disjunction. But this approach seems misguided. This is 
surely completely the wrong moral – we have it  that whilst there is still  no set  of all  sets, the 
concept 'is a set' has a cardinal number by default. But it is completely obscure what such a cardinal 
number could be, let alone how it behaves relative to any system of cardinal arithmetic. We do not 
want to say that we can put all these rogue concepts under one cardinal number that stands alone, 
independent of all other cardinal numbers – we instead want to say that such concepts do not have a 
cardinal number. If one wishes to introduce a new notion – call it 'is the schmardinal number of' – 
which is introduced by HP, then that is another matter. But clearly a concession that a new notion is 
needed is no good to the logicist – we have no interest in attempting to show that schmardinal 
arithmetic might be analytic. Thus this attempt to allow potential counterexamples is wrongheaded.
§3.3: Conditionalised Abstractions
Recall that the idea here is that the bracketed expression '[ΦF = ΦG  ↔ (F ≈ G)]' could be the 
consequent of a conditional with an existential statement as the antecedent. What we are trying to 
do is to change the form of the abstraction whilst maintaining as much of its spirit as possible. One 
point behind this is that the abstraction would be satisfied vacuously if there is referential failure of 
the terms of the LHS, but the antecedent could contain more than simply a guarantee of the right 
kind of objects; for instance, taking the example of HP, we could attempt to restrict it to say that:
F G [( A B x (x ∀ ∀ ∃ ∃ ∀  ∈A iff Fx) & ∀x (x  B iff Gx) & A, B sets) ∈ → [#F = #G ↔ (F ≈ G)]].
The content of such a principle would be to say that if the extensions of F and G form sets, then 
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they have the same cardinal number iff they are equinumerous. Such a principle would be strongly 
reminiscent of CP, as it tells us about cardinality only inasmuch as cardinality is a property of sets; 
unlike  CP,  however,  it  leaves  open  the  possibility  that  something  other  than  a  set  can  have 
cardinality. A similar proposal is considered in passing by Boolos. He writes that
“I am moved to suggest... that the conditional whose consequent is HP and whose 
antecedent  is  its  existential  quantification  might  be  regarded  as  analytic.  The 
conditional will hold, by falsity of antecedent, in all finite domains. By the axiom of 
choice, the antecedent will be true in all infinite domains, but then, we may suppose, 
nothing will prevent the consequent from being true.”92
However, there are two worries here. The first is that we no longer have an abstraction, and as such 
we cannot assume that it will be able to bear the same epistemological weight as an abstraction. 
Indeed, there is something like this going on in Wright – he takes it that abstractions can play the 
role of implicit definitions of some kind, and his arguments to this effect need not carry over to 
these conditionalised abstractions. It seems that this is Boolos' point – even if such principles could 
be made out to be analytic, this is going to be insufficient for the kind of programme envisaged by 
Wright.
The second difficulty is more straightforward and, given that it mirrors the discussion of CP in §3.1, 
it is perhaps more obviously decisive. In order to ascertain the truth of these principles, we require a 
certain amount of set theory – in my proposal it is just a criterion of application for 'is a set', in 
Boolos' it is such a criterion that includes the axiom of choice. Again, if we need it to be the case 
that some aspects of set theory that include the axiom of choice are to be analytic in order for 
logicism  to  have  a  chance,  then  prospects  are  poor.  The  point  is  not  that  there  is  anything 
controversial about the set theory involved, but that it cannot be used by the neo-logicist to establish 
92 Boolos (1997), pp.306-7
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the analyticity of any candidate principle.
There are two more promising alternatives for the neo-logicist, however. I will give a relatively 
brief assessment here, as I deal with each more fully in Chapter 3; despite this, there are a number 
of points worth making at this juncture. The first is what Wright and Hale call the 'inverse-Carnap 
conditional'93 of HP, and can be thought of best as a development of Boolos' tentative suggestion 
given  above.  The  idea  is  to  reject  the  more  usual  kind  of  conditional  used  in  giving  implicit 
definition of (scientific) terms 'if anything satisfies HP, then numbers do' in favour of the (allegedly) 
more fruitful 'if there are such things as numbers, then their criterion of identity is given by HP'. 
More formally, this inverse-Carnap proposal can be given as follows:
(ICHP): F G u v [(u = #F & v = #G) ∀ ∀ ∀ ∀ → (u = v ↔ F ≈1-1 G)]
However, whilst this proposal is clearly more tentative than HP, it is perhaps too tentative. A claim 
of the form 'if there are such things as numbers of concepts, then any two such numbers are equal 
just  when  their  concepts  are  equinumerous'  is  going  to  be  necessarily  true  –  perhaps  even 
conceptually necessary – but that does not give the epistemological result that we need. The point is 
that whilst we might be able to know that ICHP is true, we do not know why it is true – by falsity of 
antecedent or by satisfaction of both antecedent and consequent. It justifies our talking of numbers 
in the way that we do, but not our mathematical knowledge. Thus such a principle, without some 
further analytic guarantee that the antecedent will be satisfied, does not help the neo-logicist.
The second, more interesting option is to adopt a principle given first by Heck94 that he calls 'Finite 
Hume's Principle':
(FHP): F G [(F finite ˅ G finite) ∀ ∀ → (#F = #G ↔ F ≈1-1 G)]
93 Hale & Wright (2000)
94 Heck (1997)
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FHP states that finite concepts have the same number just if they are equinumerous and has as a 
trivial consequence that no finite concept has the same number as an infinite concept; however, no 
more  is  said  about  the  numbers  of  infinite  concepts.  As  such,  it  is  immune  to  the  kinds  of 
counterexamples discussed in §2. There are also two technical points to make; firstly, finititude can 
be defined within the system of second-order logic used by Frege and Wright. Secondly, Heck gives 
a slightly surprising strengthening of Frege's Theorem: that second-order arithmetic is also equi-
interpretable with a system given by appending FHP to second-order logic. Thus it is worth taking 
the time to consider whether or not FHP could be analytic.
Heck attempts to argue that there is some plausibility in taking FHP to be the principle that we use 
in actual arithmetical reasoning. Whilst this hermeneutic claim seems somewhat far-fetched, it is 
importantly beside the point – what we need to address at this point is whether it  can be both 
analytic of our concept of cardinal number and be used to explain the arithmetical knowledge that 
we in fact have. I will argue that FHP falls at the first hurdle but not obviously at the second; if the 
requirement of analyticity can be removed, then FHP is as good a candidate as any other of those 
available to the neo-logicist to explain our arithmetical knowledge. I will discuss only the former 
claim at this point, leaving the latter to Chapter 3.
What reasons do we have for taking FHP to be non-analytic? Recall Boolos' point from §1; that it is 
no good to appeal to a principle if “there is no  prior, no intuitively entrenched notion, no notion 
given independently, which [our candidate principle] is analytic of.”95. It seems to me that FHP fails 
on this account. A satisfactory account of cardinality must tell us how infinite cardinals (or at least 
small  infinite cardinals) behave – otherwise it  is  not cardinal number of which the principle is 
analytic but some less refined (pre-Cantorian, perhaps) notion. Whilst on most other approaches (in 
particular, the set-theoretic and type-theoretic – see below – variants of HP*) it has been possible to 
argue as required that the notion of cardinality of which it could analytic is the right one, that seems 
95 Boolos (1997), p.312
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impossible in this case. Thus there is an interesting difference between FHP and other candidates for 
HP* – FHP in some sense says too little to be analytic. I will return to whether or not FHP can 
nevertheless underwrite our understanding of elementary number theory, even if not of cardinality 
more generally, in the next chapter.
§3.4: Indeterminacy
The final option I will consider is that of a treatment of indeterminacy. In order to see how such a 
treatment  can  be  used  to  exclude  indefinitely  extensible  and  vague  predicates,  it  is  helpful  to 
consider the rationale behind their being a counterexample. The reasoning that leads to F !x (#F =∀ ∃  
x) is to let F=G in HP, and obtain that the number of Fs is the same as the number of Fs iff the 
things that are F can be put into 1-1 correspondence with themselves. The RHS of the biconditional 
is trivially true – identity provides such a 1-1 relation – but the LHS is not true when '#F' has no 
referent. One time that this referential failure occurs is when F is non-sortal, but another is when #F 
is indeterminate. The thought, then, is that we can ensure that such a failure of reference does not 
occur by appealing to an account of how one treats indeterminacy.
One kind  of  account  would  be supervaluationist  in  spirit.  The  treatment  of  predicates  with  no 
determinate number because of their having no determinate size of extension would be that on any 
way of making such predicates precise, they will have a determinate extension and number. The 
clearest example amongst the indefinitely extensible predicates is 'set'; on the iterative conception96, 
whereby one can always form more sets by going up a level in the cumulative hierarchy of sets, 
there is a determinate number of sets for all sets up to and including those of a given level of the 
hierarchy. The thought is that on any way of making the concept 'set' precise – something that is 
96 See Boolos (1971) for a clear exposition of this.
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identified with fixing a level in the hierarchy and taking the domain of discourse to be all sets 
formed up to this point – there will be a determinate number of sets. If something like this is right, 
indefinitely  extensible  concepts  more  generally  and  vague  predicates  need  not  give  rise  to 
counterexamples to HP. Thus whilst we would still need to find a way to solve the problems raised 
by 'heterological' and its semantically paradoxical cousins, we would have a partial patch to HP.
However, whilst this seems initially promising, difficulties arise when one attempts to put flesh on 
the bones. If the thought is to say that for any level of the cumulative hierarchy of sets, there will be 
a determinate number of sets, then our new HP* should read as follows:
L F G [# (F, L) = # (G, L) ∀ ∀ ∀ ↔ (F ≈L G)].
But at this juncture there is the same dialectical response as in the case of the previous appeals to set 
theory.  One  can  perfectly  well  agree  with  Boolos  that  referencing  levels  of  the  set  theoretic 
hierarchy is “entirely natural, free from artificiality, not at all ad hoc”97 without being forced to 
acknowledge that a principle making essential use of this notion of a set can count as analytic. 
Again, we cannot take parts of set theory to be analytic in our attempts to render any candidate HP* 
analytically true.
Another way would be to introduce notions peculiar to type theory rather than set theory. The idea 
here would be to relativise the '#' function to whatever type theoretic notion plays the role of a given 
level of the set theoretic hierarchy. Thus we have a succession of #L functions that correspond to and 
depend on each way of making 'set' or 'ordinal' determinate. The corresponding formal principle 
would be something like the following:
F G [#∀ ∀ LF = #LG ↔ (F ≈L G)]
97 Ibid, p.16
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However, again there are difficulties with this approach. There is the usual problem of requiring too 
much theoretical apparatus to be analytic, but in this case there is a more pressing and more specific 
issue. There is a conflict between the insistence of the type theorist that such a definition (if that is 
what our latest incarnation of HP* really is) be predicative and the proof of Frege's Theorem; in 
order to prove that there is an infinity of natural numbers, it must be possible for the function to 
range over any and all concepts and not just those relativised to types. Thus it is by no means clear 
that this kind of principle would be sufficiently strong to generate Frege Arithmetic, and hence it is 
inadequate for the neo-logicist.
Of  course,  there  is  always  the  option  of  taking  such  a  treatment  of  indeterminacy  such  as  a 
supervaluationist approach as being in some way primitive; were this to be acceptable, there would 
be  no  need  to  further  qualify  HP,  as  indeterminate  predicates  would  no  longer  give  rise  to 
counterexamples. However, this seems to be a fairly desperate and unsurprisingly unsuccessful last 
resort. It is by no means obvious that for any given treatment of indeterminacy that it is the one that 
ought to be adopted, but any given treatment is certainly not going to be analytic. There is nothing 
indefinite about the criterion of application of 'is an ordinal'  – it is only that it gives rise to an 
indefinitely extensible totality. Hence it cannot be anything to do with the meaning of the terms that 
(say)  a supervaluationist  treatment  of  'is  an ordinal'  is  correct.  Thus it  seems that  any suitable 
modification of HP to account for indeterminate predicates is going to be too theoretically loaded to 
be analytic.
§4: Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that Wright's argument that targets a vindication of a sort of neo-
logicism relies on the false premise that HP is analytic. HP fails to be analytic because it is false, 
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and the most natural attempts to patch HP such that the problematic cases are excluded give rise to 
principles that are not analytic on any reasonable construal of the notion. However, all that has been 
shown so far is that Wright has set his sights too high; he has attempted, like Frege, to show that 
arithmetic has a particular semantic and epistemological status that it does not have. This leaves 
open the possibility that to reject wholesale the neo-logicist approach is premature – thus Wright's 
original insight about Frege's philosophy of mathematics is taken a step further. It is therefore an 
open question whether or not there is some other way of obtaining the epistemological result that 
would vindicate neo-logicism as a resolution of Benacerraf's challenge. It is to this further question 
that I turn in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
Recall  that  Benacerraf's  challenge  is  to  explain  how it  is  possible  that  we  have  mathematical 
knowledge  and  an  ability  to  refer  to  mathematical  objects.  Wright's  neo-logicist's  explanatory 
programme consisted of showing that the truths of arithmetic, at least, are analytic and hence are 
epistemically accessible if the axioms of arithmetic are. The discussion in the foregoing chapter 
demonstrated that the most natural ways of putting flesh on these bones are inadequate. However, 
the conclusion to draw need not be that the strategy is entirely misguided – the truths of arithmetic 
need not be  analytic in order for us to be able to know them in the ways indicated by the neo-
logicist. It can be easy to lose sight of the epistemological target: knowing the truths of arithmetic. 
The  viability  of  this  kind  epistemological  programme has  not  been  investigated.  As  such,  this 
chapter  is  exploratory in  nature and raises  two issues.  The first  is  whether  or  not  this  kind of 
epistemic neo-logicism is really viable – how well does taking a non-analytic principle on which to 
base our knowledge of arithmetic fit with the linguistic approach suggested in chapter 1? If this 
issue does not constitute an insurmountable obstacle, then we can raise the question of how such an 
epistemic neo-logicism would best  be formulated.  In what follows I give an overview of some 
possible options and highlight associated difficulties with each.
§1: New Neo-Logicist Strategies
Wright's argument for the analyticity of arithmetic was given as follows:
1. Frege's Theorem – arithmetic is a (recognisable) second-order logical consequence of HP.
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2. If HP is analytically true, its recognisable logical consequences are analytically true.
3. HP is analytically true.
4. Therefore, arithmetic is analytically true.
In the previous chapter, I showed that (3) is false as HP is not true and its modifications are not 
analytic. But it is possible to see (2) and (3) as being specific instances of the following argument 
schema:
1. Arithmetic is a (recognisable) second-order logical consequence of HP*.98
2'. If HP* has A, its recognisable logical consequences have A.
3'. HP* has A.
4'. Therefore, arithmetic has A.
Where A stands in place of an expression for an epistemic status that entails knowability, such as 
analyticity.
Evaluating this argument as it stands is not a fruitful exercise, as its soundness is relative to the 
choice of epistemic status to replace A. In this chapter I will consider two ways of filling out the 
argument, and assess each option according to two criteria. Firstly, there is the substantive question 
as to whether any candidate epistemic status that is weaker than analyticity will thereby fail to be 
powerful enough to solve our original problem. The point is that even if the argument is sound, it 
may not be able to underwrite any satisfactory resolution of Benacerraf's challenge. Secondly, there 
is  the  issue  of  soundness  –  does  the  epistemic  status  in  question  transmit  across  recognisable 
second-order  logical  consequence?  And  does  our  choice  of  HP*  (a  true  principle  used  as  an 
alternative to HP that depends on our choice of status) have the relevant status? 
98 Note that HP is of no use if it is false; as such, we must use a suitable HP* that has the same resources as HP. This 
result will be equivalent to Frege's Theorem, and the ensuing argument will be formally valid.
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The two approaches that I will develop in this chapter are the claim that HP* is knowable a priori99 
and the claim that HP* explains our concept of cardinal number. These should be contrasted with 
Wright's stated aim to give an implicit definition of cardinal number. However, whilst Wright's aim 
is clear enough given the general thrust of the corpus of his work on this matter, the following 
suggestive passages can be seen as an adumbration of each of these alternatives:
“Frege's Theorem will still ensure the truth of the following: that the fundamental 
laws of arithmetic can be derived within a system of second-order logic augmented 
by a principle whose role is to explain, if not exactly to define, the general notion of 
identity of cardinal number; and that this explanation proceeds in terms of a notion 
which can be defined in terms of the concepts of second-order  logic.  If  such an 
explanatory  principle,  in  company  with  'implicit  definitions'  generally,  can  be 
regarded as analytic, then that should suffice at least to demonstrate the analyticity of 
arithmetic. Even if that term is found troubling … it will remain that HP [gives rise 
to] one clear a priori route into a recognition of the truth of … the fundamental laws 
of arithmetic.”100
“If [HP] may be viewed as a complete explanation – as showing how the concept of 
cardinal number may be fully understood on a purely logical basis – then arithmetic 
will have been shown up by Frege's Theorem not [to be] part of logic, it is true, but 
as transcending logic only to the extent that it  makes use of a  logical abstraction 
principle  –  one  whose  right-hand side  deploys  only logical  notions.  … Such an 
epistemological result, it seems to me, would be an outcome still worth describing as 
logicism, albeit rather different from the conventional, more stringent understanding 
of the term.”101
99 I will (to aid clarity and readability) at times abbreviate 'knowable a priori' to simply 'a priori'; thus a truth is a priori 
iff it is a truth that is knowable a priori.
100 Wright (1997), p.279
101 Ibid., pp.279-80
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Wright  thus  attempts  to  vindicate  a  version  of  logicism  by  appealing  to  three  distinct 
epistemological notions: analyticity,  apriority and explanation of a concept.  He runs these three 
alternatives together, but it seems to me that this is a mistake. If the target (as indicated by the first 
passage) is epistemological, we need only to consider how best to achieve such an epistemological 
result.  One way to  do  this  would  be  through implicit  definition  and showing arithmetic  to  be 
analytic and hence knowable a priori, but (as we have seen) such a claim is unsustainable – it is an 
implausibly strong claim. However, it is still an open question whether or not one or more of the 
more modest proposals of seeking to only to explain our arithmetical knowledge either in virtue of 
the apriority of a suitable HP* or by treating HP* as an explanation in logical terms of cardinal 
number are more plausible.
However, before addressing each of these options it is worth exploring a natural objection to the 
separation of each of these epistemological notions. The objection is not a denial that these notions 
come  apart,  but  instead  that  the  relevant  differences  between  the  notions  cannot  be  usefully 
exploited  by the  neo-logicist:  any neo-logicist  position  based  on  some  weaker  epistemological 
notion would be unstable. The thought is that there is a tension between an endorsement of the 
Context  Principle  –  first  and  foremost  a  linguistic principle  –  as  the  basis  of  a  solution  to 
Benacerraf's challenge on the one hand, and of a non-linguistic epistemological target on the other. 
The  Context  Principle,  as  a  principle  governing  meaning,  can  correspondingly only license  an 
appeal to those principles that operate at the level of giving the meanings of the terms that they 
contain – in other words, analytic principles.
The thought is that  we are perfectly entitled to appeal to analytic principles to do the required 
epistemological work, but that is because analyticity has both a semantic and an epistemological 
dimension to it. We are faced originally with a problem about reference, and particular analytic 
principle  can  help  us  solve  it;  the  fact  that  they  also  help  us  solve  a  parallel  problem about 
knowledge is a significant bonus, but it is no more than that. The neo-logicist way of framing the 
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issue precludes taking the knowledge problem to be central, as doing so licences the use of tools 
that are not fit for purpose. Once we start appealing to principles with some weaker epistemological 
status that do not help to fix meanings, we can no longer assume that the Context Principle will do 
the same kind of work.
To put the point another way: consider that in chapter 1, all the justification of the Context Principle 
and  abstractions  took  place  under  the  assumption  that  abstractions  could  operate  as  implicit 
definitions. Wright and Hale, for instance, talked about how abstractions could fix “by stipulation” 
the  truth  conditions  of  their  left-  and  right-hand sides,  whilst  Fine's  discussion  of  the  Context 
Principle was in terms of “creative definitions” and of linguistic practice being “partly constitutive 
of reference”. Thus it is clear how the solution to both the knowledge and reference problems are 
supposed to run given the proviso that the relevant abstractions to which one appeals are analytic. 
The challenge is that it is at the very least unclear whether rejecting the assumption is sufficient to 
stymie the line of argument offered in those discussions.
This kind of objection is pressing the thought that only analytic principles are acceptable for the 
neo-logicist.  Given  the  conclusion  of  the  previous  chapter,  this  result  would  be  tantamount  to 
sounding the death-knell for neo-logicism. Moreover, perhaps an assumption of this kind would 
help to explain why Wright would not seriously consider retreating from the position that HP is 
analytic:  if  it  were not, it  would be of no use to him. However,  it  is not clear to me that this 
objection is well-founded. It is certainly correct to point out that there is tension here, but such 
tension seems to be less serious than first appearances might suggest.
To attempt to give a decisive rebuttal to the objection would require more space than I have here, 
but I will present two considerations that could lead one to think that the foregoing line amounts to 
much less than a knock-down argument. The first is to point out that the Context Principle was 
predominately (and most  controversially)  used  to  bolster  the case  for  adopting the Ontological 
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Plenitude Thesis about certain abstractions. This was the view that if we believe an abstraction to be 
true, we should believe in the existence of all the objects (abstract or otherwise) to which there is 
apparent explicit reference. This might most naturally be used to solve the reference problem, but 
we are certainly not forced to see things in this way. That the apparent reference of abstraction 
principles is genuine reference is something that could be ascertained in some other way. The point 
is that whilst it is very tempting to try to kill two birds with one stone by appealing to analytic 
abstraction principles, we need not do so; we are free to treat abstraction principles as being best 
used to solve the knowledge problem.
The second is  that  even if  the thought  that  underlies the objection is  a  good one,  it  would be 
decisive only given the implicit assumption that a solution to the knowledge problem that does not 
give rise to a parallel solution to the (presumed to be parallel) reference problem is in some way 
unsatisfactory. If we reject this assumption, then we are free to attempt to solve one problem at a 
time. We can deny that the problems are parallel or that their being parallel problems would be 
sufficient to force us to adopt parallel solutions. We might agree that giving parallel solutions to 
parallel problems is a desideratum of any potential line of response, but it need not be an inviolable 
methodological principle. Thus whilst we have a reason to proceed with caution, rather more must 
be done to show that the whole strategy of using an epistemically weaker principle is misbegotten in 
some way. This is not to say that our putative objector could not have any more to add, and indeed it 
may well be something of a success to persuade a defender of a view to be suspicious of it; it is 
merely to point out that the objection cannot be as decisive as it might appear.  Nonetheless, the 
issue raised by the objection is crucial and requires further attention if some suitable epistemic 
status is to be accorded to arithmetic and justified by the kind of argument put forward in this 
chapter.
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§2: Cardinal Number Explained
The first option I will  look at is the idea of HP*'s serving as an explanation of the concept of 
cardinal number. As it is difficult to frame this in terms of the argument schema given above, it is 
better to make a small modification as follows:
1. Arithmetic is a (recognisable) second-order logical consequence of HP*.
2''. If HP* has A, its recognisable logical consequences have B.
3''. HP* has A.
4''. Therefore, arithmetic has B.
Where  B, like  A, is a schematic variable standing for an expression for an epistemic status that 
entails knowability. We can then run an argument based on HP* explaining our concept of cardinal 
number by a straightforward substitution of an epistemic status for each of our schematic variables:
1. Arithmetic is a (recognisable) second-order logical consequence of HP*.
2-ECN. If HP* explains our concept of cardinal number, our understanding/knowledge of its 
recognisable logical consequences can be explained by HP*.
3-ECN. HP* explains our concept of cardinal number.
4-ECN. Therefore, our understanding/knowledge of arithmetic can be explained by HP*
We cannot  treat  2-ECN and  4-ECN as  instantiations  of  our  original  (2')  and  (4'),  as  it  seems 
somewhat unclear what 'the consequences of HP* are explained by HP*' could mean. However (2-
ECN) and (4-ECN) are clearly instances of our latter, weaker, argument schema, and are further 
filled out in a very natural way. We can explain what we know by appealing to HP* and Frege's 
Theorem, or we can explain how we are able to think about and refer to abstract number terms by 
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appealing to HP* and Frege's Theorem.
The key idea here is that HP* is designed to be in some sense a  purely logical  explanation: an 
abstraction principle has an expression containing the explanandum as its LHS, and some kind of 
explanans  as  the  RHS;  crucially,  this  explanans  is  a  formula  of  pure  second-order  logic. 
Abstractions give necessary and sufficient conditions for the obtaining of some fact about abstract 
objects, stating that whether or not such a fact obtains is solely a matter of whether some second-
order  logical  formula is  true.  Thus if  it  is  possible  to explain particular  truths about  particular 
abstract objects by giving such a necessary and sufficient condition, then it seems plausible to say 
that we can explain our understanding or knowledge of such truths in terms of our understanding or 
knowledge of the relevant logical formulae and the abstraction principle – or, more concisely, (2-
ECN).
Wright  has  plenty to  say about  a  programme along these lines  at  the end of his  [1983] in his 
discussion of Number-Theoretic Logicism (III):
“[I]t is possible, using the concepts of higher-order logic with identity, to explain a 
genuinely  sortal  notion  of  cardinal  number;  and  hence  to  deduce  appropriate 
statements  of  the  fundamental  truths  of  number-theory,  in  particular  the  Peano 
Axioms,  in  an appropriate  system of  higher-order  logic  with  identity to  which  a 
statement of that explanation has been added as an axiom.”102
One striking feature of this thesis is that it is set up in contrast to a relevantly similar version of 
logicism – his Number-Theoretic Logicism (II) – that couches the relevant epistemological notions 
as definitions of arithmetical terms in logical terms, rather than explanations. However, Wright's 
subsequent development of his logicism demonstrates that he had not abandoned all commitment to 
102 Wright (1983), p.153
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working at the level of (implicit) definition – raising the question of whether he ought instead to 
have pursued a line of argument working on the level of explanations after all.
The reason that availing ourselves of HP as an explanatory axiom can give rise to something that its 
supporters might call logicism is, as noted, that the explanans is given in purely logical terms. As 
such “there will still be a route to an apprehension of the basic truths of number-theory to follow 
which will require knowledge only of the concepts, truths and techniques of second-order logic with 
identity.”103 The idea is that HP provides an explanation of the concept of cardinal number, which 
(when supplemented by understanding of second-order logic) in turn provides an explanation of 
why an arithmetical truth is a truth rather than a falsehood.
Whilst this kind of proposal is superficially attractive, much of this evaporates under closer scrutiny. 
Wright's discussion of this kind of solution assumes that the relevant notion of an 'explanation of a 
concept' is fairly intuitive and clear, but this is far from obvious. Wright explicates it as “a statement 
whose role is to fix the character of a certain concept”104; but this, as Boolos points out, seems to be 
an attempt to tacitly “assign it an epistemological status importantly similar to the one it was once 
thought analytic judgements, including definitions, enjoy.”105 As we are trying to distance ourselves 
from  this  kind  of  assimilation  of  explanation  and  analyticity,  we  would  need  to  say  that  an 
explanation of a concept is something different. However, trying to give some kind of substance to 
such a notion of explanation that does not rule out the possibility of its having the kind of epistemic 
significance required by the neo-logicist is not easy and perhaps not even possible (again, as noted 
by Boolos).
There is an associated worry as to whether such a notion of explanation of a concept is going to 
give rise to a solution to the sceptical problem with which we started. The more general problem is 
103 Ibid., En 18.2
104 Ibid., p.153
105 Boolos (1997)
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to explain how it is possible for us to have the knowledge that we in fact have, and the more general 
solution  is  the  suggestion  that  we explain  it  in  terms  of  our  knowledge  of  some foundational 
principle – HP* – that has second-order arithmetic as a logical consequence. However, we must be 
able to give an account that  is  acceptable  to  the sceptic of why it  is  that  we are  warranted in 
claiming to know HP*. To say that 'it explains our concept of cardinal number' is only enough if the 
notion  of  explanation  in  play entails  knowability,  but  it  is  far  from obvious  that  there  is  any 
reasonable construal of an explanation of a concept (distinct from analyticity) that has the requisite 
entailment. For instance, one possible reading of the claim that 'it explains our concept of cardinal 
number'  is  as  a  sociological  point  –  that  we  (actually)  understand  cardinality  because  of  our 
knowledge of  HP*.  But,  clearly,  this  would be of  no philosophical  use.  Again,  we need some 
reading of an explanation of a concept that naturally gives rise to a reason to accept HP*, but it is 
not clear how this could be done without retreating to a position that has already been considered 
and dismissed.
§3: A Priori Arithmetic
I will finish this chapter by exploring the case for treating HP* as a priori. The argument that is 
being considered here runs as follows:
1.        Arithmetic is a (recognisable) second-order logical consequence of HP*.
2-AP. If HP* is a priori, its recognisable logical consequences are a priori.
3-AP. HP* is a priori.
4-AP. Therefore, arithmetic is a priori.
As we have seen, at some level Wright took the real target to be the apriority of (at least) arithmetic, 
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an epistemological result that he believes would follow from the semantic result of the analyticity of 
(at least) arithmetic. The idea is that by relying on an epistemological reading of analyticity, we can 
deduce the apriority of arithmetic from the stronger semantic thesis that it is analytic. However, it is 
worth noting at this point that the questions of analyticity and apriority come apart – even if it may 
be safely assumed that analytic statements are a priori, it need not be the case that we must establish 
analyticity in order to justify treating statements as a priori. It is open to us to say that a given 
statement  can  be  analytic  but  somehow obscurely  so,  and  hence  some other  route  to  a  priori 
knowledge is required; another alternative is to say that a given statement can be non-analytic but 
nonetheless  a  priori.  Having  said  this,  the  'take-home  message'  is  that  analyticity  is  first  and 
foremost a semantic notion (albeit one that can carry heavy epistemological weight), apriority is an 
epistemological notion, and the two need not be coextensive.
With this in mind, then, let us begin to evaluate the above argument by considering (2-AP). The 
question is whether apriority transmits across recognisable – knowable – logical consequence. It is 
not quite right to see this as an instance of an epistemic closure principle – if S knows (a priori) that 
p and S knows that p implies q then S 'is in a position to know (a priori)' that q – but the idea is 
much the same. Whilst this is loosely formulated, the point is clear enough; we have a clear a priori 
route to knowledge via knowable logical implication. In endorsing such a principle we take it that it 
can both explain the knowledge that we already have – we could have come to know it by our 
knowledge of HP* and by following the proof of any given theorem of Peano arithmetic106 – and of 
any knowable but as yet unknown arithmetical truth (for the same reasons).
In order to assess (2-AP) we should consider whether or not there are important differences between 
this  kind of restricted epistemic closure principle and the semantic closure principle (2).  Prima 
facie,  it  might  seem  as  though  semantic  status  is  something  that  transmits  across  logical 
consequence rather better than epistemic status, but this is perhaps not true in the case of apriority. 
106 The existence of such a proof follows from Frege's theorem.
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In the case of an unrestricted epistemic closure principle – that knowledge simpliciter is closed 
under known entailment – there are a number of purported counterexamples, but all depend on there 
being some unknown proposition q that is known to follow from a known proposition p. In the case 
that we are interested in, the relevant q must be unknowable (a priori) rather than merely unknown. 
But if p is a priori and the entailment to q is known, then that q can be deduced seems to follow; 
moreover, it seems to follow that q would then be knowable a priori. As such, it seems to be a rather 
unpromising line of response to put pressure on (2-AP); instead it is better to focus on (3-AP) – the 
claim that the relevant choice of HP* could be known a priori.
Moving on to (3-AP), the plausibility of the case for HP*'s being a priori is of course dependent on 
the choice of HP*. For instance, in cases where HP* is some kind of restriction of HP, HP* will be a 
priori only if we can know something – precisely what will depend on the choice of HP* – about 
the kinds of things to which we restrict HP. In what follows I will consider various options for the 
neo-logicist, but there is an essential preliminary issue to address first. In order to answer whether 
any given HP* is  a priori,  it  will  be important  to bring into focus what would count  as being 
knowable a priori. The obvious and natural characterisation of a priori knowledge – a proposition 
“which  can  be  known  to  be  true  without  any  justification  from the  character  of  the  subject's 
experience”107 – is unfortunately not much help, as what is at issue is not whether HP* is knowable 
a  priori  rather than by justification from experience but whether  it  is  knowable at  all.  What  is 
required, then, is to suggest a way in which we might come to know HP* that seems to fit with how 
we might come to know a priori truths more generally. This would fit very well with Benacerraf's 
original generality requirements – that how we know purely mathematical statements must accord 
with a more general explanation of how we know natural language statements.
It seems worth pausing at this point to note that this way of framing the issue makes it clear that this 
kind of position is likely to be fairly unstable. One strand of Quine's famous critique of the analytic 
107 Boghossian & Peacocke (2000), p.1
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and the a priori108 seeks to tie the two together in order to reject both. Boghossian and Peacocke's 
reconstruction provides us with a helpful taxonomy of ways to justify a priori knowledge:
“Quine may, in rough outline, be represented as having reasoned as follows. Unless 
we are to resort to postulating occult faculties of knowledge, a priori knowledge will 
be explicable only if grasp of meaning – understanding – is somehow sufficient for 
knowledge of truth. Understanding will only suffice for knowledge of truth, however, 
if there are sentences that are true purely by virtue of their meaning. But there can be 
no such sentences, and so a priori knowledge is not explicable.”109
Thus in order to defend the view that a particular truth is a priori, one must either establish its 
analyticity or separate the analytic from the a priori. Whilst Quine would see at least the former 
strategy as doomed to failure, it is part of the background to the discussion of chapter 2 that there 
are propositions “true purely by virtue of their meaning”; what was disputed there was that any 
appropriate HP* could be analytic. Thus the task of one seeking to demonstrate that HP* is a priori 
is to show that the a priori outruns the analytic and explain why HP* is an example of such a 
phenomenon.
However,  many (admittedly somewhat  nascent)  strategies  for  pursuing such an  explanation are 
ruled out by the overall project of the neo-logicist110. To give just one example, Yablo aims in his 
[2000] to demonstrate that a view that commits us to the truth of “a priori bridge principles”111 
allows  us  to  prove  the  existence  of  almost  anything  we  want  “from a  priori  and/or  empirical 
banalities”112; he then attempts to explain our commitment to such principles as being adequately 
108 See Quine (1936) and (1962)
109 Boghossian & Peacocke (2000), p.5
110 Boghossian & Peacocke (in their (2000), Introduction) give an extremely brief summary of each approach; they use 
the term “non-factive” for strategies that do not commit to the truth of a priori principles to explain a priority, a term 
that seems both appropriate and illustrative of the unavailability of each of these to the neo-logicist.
111 Yablo (2000), p.199
112 Loc. cit.
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modelled by our commitment to certain metaphorical statements. But recall that the neo-logicist's 
aim  is  to  explain  our  mathematical  knowledge;  if  this  is  to  be  a  successful  explanation,  we 
presumably cannot appeal to principles to whose truth we are not committed. Such a view would 
not  be  consonant  with  Benacerraf's  semantic  requirement  that  mathematical  truth  is  not 
fundamentally different from truth in other domains.
Despite this somewhat bleak prognosis, this kind of scepticism is more general than specific. It is an 
undoubted implicit assumption of neo-logicism that a priori knowledge is possible and, presumably, 
that it is not just analytic truths that are a priori. As such, whilst there is a substantial issue here, the 
sceptic  is  not  addressing the concerns of the neo-logicist  on his  own terms.  A more damaging 
approach  would  be  to  grant  the  neo-logicist  his  assumptions  but  demonstrate  that  there  is 
nonetheless no adequate way of filling out the details of his programme. With this in mind, then, I 
turn to an assessment of the different options for the neo-logicist.
§3.1: Set-Theoretic Hume's Principle
First of all, let us try to explain the apriority of arithmetic in terms of a a version of HP where the 
domain  is  restricted  to  all  and  only those  concepts  whose  extensions  form a  set.  Call  such  a 
principle HP-Sets. The first thing to note is that the analogue to Frege's theorem based on HP-Sets 
rather than HP should follow, as we have a total function on an altered domain; however, the change 
of domain in this fashion is irrelevant to the proof as (crucially) 'is a natural number' has a set 
extension. This means that we can prove, on the basis of HP-Sets, that there is an infinity of natural 
numbers. Secondly, recall that this is equivalent to Cantor's Principle (and hence presumably true), 
but cannot be considered to be analytic if, as required by the neo-Fregean, cardinality is a property 
of concepts rather than of sets. The important question at this point is whether HP-Sets is a priori, 
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even if not analytic.
One potentially fruitful  starting-point in seeking to discover how we know HP-Sets at  all  is to 
consider why we need to restrict to concepts whose instances form a set. The problematic concepts 
were those in which there was no definite collection of things that constituted the extension of that 
concept. In the case of semantically paradoxical predicates I argued that the difficulty arose at the 
semantic  level,  whereas there was a more fundamental,  metaphysical  problem with indefinitely 
extensible predicates. Whilst there were differences in how the indefiniteness was explained, the 
point is that in each case there could be no cardinal number of the problematic concept because the 
concept is in some way indefinite.
Rather than talking in terms of definite and indefinite concepts, it is more perspicuous to frame the 
discussion in  terms of  definite  and indefinite  extensions of  concepts.  We can  define a  definite 
extension as follows:
(Definition of 'definite extension'): A concept C has a definite extension iff for any 
entity E, exactly one of the following is true: {E is an instance of C; E is not an 
instance of C}.
With this in mind, we should note that sets, in marked contrast to concepts, are paradigmatically 
definite. By the axiom of extensionality, sets have their identity just in virtue of their elements. 
Moreover if we have a definite collection of things, we can 'lasso' them to form a set – it is this kind 
of idea that underpins the iterative conception and cumulative hierarchy of sets on which, say, ZF is 
based. This is captured by the following conceptual truth:
(Principle of definiteness of sets): For any collective S, S is a set iff for any entity E, 
exactly one of the following is true: {E is a member of S; E is not a member of S}.
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From this it follows that a concept has a definite extension iff there is some set that contains all and 
only those entities that  are instances of C. Thus we can take as an auxiliary principle the very 
plausible 'a concept has a definite extension iff its instances form a set.'
If this is true, then the next step in establishing the apriority of HP-Sets is a way of knowing the 
further principle that 'a concept has a cardinal number iff it has a definite extension.' Were we to 
justify such a claim, we would then have it that a concept has a cardinal number iff it has a definite 
extension, and a concept has a definite extension iff its extension forms a set. Therefore a concept 
has a cardinal number iff its extension forms a set. But this is just the principle that we need to 
warrant restricting HP to concepts with set extensions. If there is nothing untoward about such a 
restriction,  then it seems that we have a natural,  non-ad hoc way to alter HP that excludes the 
problematic concepts and incurs minimal epistemological costs. It seems to me that this is the kind 
of result that the neo-logicist is looking for, as we have at least “one clear a priori route into a 
recognition of the truth of … the fundamental laws of arithmetic”. Thus if HP-Sets is a priori and its 
apriority transmits across second-order logical consequence,  arithmetic is  a priori;  therefore the 
truths of arithmetic are knowable even if what we know are facts about abstract objects.
But what are we to make of the latter auxiliary principle – that a concept has cardinality iff it is 
definite? One way to evaluate it is to split the biconditional into its left-to-right and right-to-left 
directions. The left-to-right direction seems fairly plausible – if a concept has a cardinal number, 
then it is definite. One way to bring out this plausibility is to consider putative counterexamples to 
the claim. This would be some indefinite concept with a particular cardinal number attached to it; 
but such a concept would have to be a concept such that no matter which things fell under it, the 
number of things that fell under it would not change.
But this kind of case seems incoherent. This can be brought out by considering a small cardinality 
example in which a concept C has cardinality 1 but no definite extension. Thus there are entities E1 
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and E2 such that exactly one is an instance of C but it is not determinate which of  E1 and E2 is that 
instance. But by the former condition, we have two possibilities: that E1 is an instance but E2 is not, 
or E2 is an instance and E1 is not. But in either case it is determinate which of E1 and E2 is an 
instance, contrary to the latter condition.
The right-to-left direction is rather more problematic. It presumably requires something like the 
following: if a concept has a definite extension, then there is a fact of the matter as to whether or not 
any given thing falls under that concept. This much follows from our definition. However, it is by 
no means straightforward to take the further step and establish that this result can help us to show 
that such a concept has a cardinal number. We have merely identified a necessary but insufficient 
condition. It may be sufficient if we further restrict to  enumerable concepts, as such concepts are 
equinumerous with some initial segment of the numerals. Indeed, it is hard to see what more could 
be  required  for  a  concept  to  have  a  cardinal  number  beyond  it  being  definite  and  being 
equinumerous with some initial segment of the numerals. 
However, it is not clear that such a restriction is warranted; recall that a restricted version of HP can 
be a priori only if we can know a priori something about that restriction. We now need to know 
something a priori about both sets and sizes of concepts, and this latter restriction may be difficult 
to justify even on its own terms. Furthermore (as we shall see) a restriction to enumerable concepts 
is a very strong constraint, inasmuch as a version of HP* restricted to enumerable concepts allows 
us to prove everything that we want to prove. We need not appeal to any principles about sets at all 
if we have such a limitation of size. Hence such a restriction seems at best somewhat out of place, 
even if it can be justified on independent grounds. Therefore as things stand,  from a neo-logicist  
viewpoint our original conditional – that a concept has cardinality if it is definite – lacks sufficient 
motivation.
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§3.2: Conditional Hume's Principle
We can try a different tack by noting that the difficulties with HP and its variants seem to arise with 
their right-to-left halves. The thought is that whilst we take it that numbers and their ilk actually 
exist, we cannot presuppose such an existence; but endorsing the right-to-left half without further 
justification is to make just such a presupposition. Instead, then, let us reconsider ICHP
(ICHP): F G u v [(u = #F & v = #G) ∀ ∀ ∀ ∀ → (u = v ↔ F ≈1-1 G)]
as  discussed in  chapter  2:  if  there  are  such things as numbers of concepts,  then any two such 
numbers are equal just when their concepts are equinumerous. As this principle is essentially a 
conditional rather than a biconditional, we do not have the troublesome presupposition of the right-
to-left half of HP. Moreover the principle is not subject to the same kinds of counterexamples as HP 
itself, as whenever there is no number of Fs or Gs the conditional will still be true by falsity of 
antecedent.
This kind of principle is originally supposed by Wright and Hale to be without much merit precisely 
because it lacks the existential commitments of HP; this in turn derives from their belief that caution 
is unnecessary at this point. We can unpack the thought that underlies such a thesis by considering a 
suggestive  passage  from  Wright  and  Hale  in  which  they  discuss  the  relationship  of  a  priori 
knowledge and the stipulated conditionals of the form of HP or ICHP:
“How  in  principle  might  the  infinity  of  the  series  of  natural  numbers  ever  be 
recognised?  Of  course  there's  the  option  of  simply  denying  that  it  can  be...  but 
anyone sympathetic to the opposing thought, viz. that the infinity of natural numbers 
– and indeed the truth of the Dedekind-Peano axioms – is part of our most basic 
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knowledge, should be receptive to the idea that it is inferential knowledge, grounded 
ultimately  in  deeper  principles  of  some  kind  determining  the  nature  of  cardinal 
number.”113
The point here is that all parties to the debate – including the Benacerrafian sceptic – can agree that 
we do have knowledge of the relevant arithmetical facts. We can further agree that we can infer this 
knowledge from knowledge of some 'deeper principle'. Indeed, it can be conceded (following on 
from the discussion of chapter 1) that such a 'deeper principle' can play the role of fixing a reference 
of number terms and be an explanatory route to our knowledge of arithmetic. Wright and Hale go 
on to say that this 'deeper principle' can itself be stipulated fairly freely, and that this does not in 
turn make the existence of the natural numbers and the obtaining of arithmetical facts a matter of 
stipulation. They argue for this by 
“urging... that the stipulation of HP should be seen first and foremost as a meaning-
conferring  stipulation  –  one  providing  for  the  introduction  and  elimination  of 
contexts of numerical identity – of which it is a relatively un-immediate, interesting 
and welcome consequence that there is a population of objects of which the Peano 
axioms are true.”114
However, it is at this point that the disagreement becomes a little sharper. The thought that Wright 
and Hale wish to dispute is that our epistemic warrant to a given principle is only as good as our 
warrant to its consequences; as such on their view, to stipulate HP without further justification or 
explanation is not simply to help oneself to its consequences (and hence, a fortiori,  it  is not to 
stipulate  into  existence  particular  objects).  This  is  why caution  is  supposed to  be  unnecessary. 
However, the upshot of chapter 2 is that even to allow that stipulation of HP were to be admissible 
if it  were true, there is no acceptable true substitute principle for stipulation. As such, we must 
113 Hale & Wright (2000), p.147
114 Ibid., p.148
90
accept that caution is necessary, but this need not be a barrier to tentatively endorsing a conditional 
such as ICHP (with no consequences that entail the existence of particular objects) and asking what 
kind of epistemic status it has. Do we need to know it, and how can we know it (if we can know it 
at all)?
One attractive feature of ICHP is that it seems to serve as a partial explanation of the concept of 
cardinal number. It is an instance of a claim of the form 'if anything is an x, then it is F, G, …', a 
statement  that  can  help  to  tell  us  what  is  distinctive  about  the  concept  of  cardinal  number. 
Moreover, as noted above, it seems to escape the problems associated with the consequence of HP 
that all concepts have a unique number; there is no entailment either to there being a (problematic) 
number of all sets or ordinals, nor is there a stipulation of the existence of infinitely many particular 
objects. Thus it seems as though it is a candidate for being necessarily true and knowable a priori.
However, such a proposal seems a little lightweight for the neo-logicist's purposes. In ICHP, we 
have a principle that we can know to be true but not one that we know what makes it true. There 
seems to be little that is disanalagous from the Benacerrafian sceptic's point of view between an 
arithmetical theory based on ICHP, and a scientific theory based on the inverse-Carnap conditional 
'if there is such a thing as phlogiston, then it is removed during a chemical reaction'. In both cases, 
the idea is to treat the existence of numbers or phlogiston as part of a theory which may or may not 
be true; as such, if there is in fact no such thing as a number or phlogiston, then the theories have 
precisely nothing to say. But this means that these kinds of principles might well be true, but are 
epistemically ineffectual. Whilst they help give some kind of partial explanation of a concept, they 
do not help answer the sceptic. What we need is a reason to think not only that the conditional is 
true but that the antecedent is true, and that is not given by such a conditional.
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§3.3: Finite Hume's Principle
The final versions of HP* that I will consider are Heck's FHP and a variant of it. Recall that Heck's 
own principle is 
(FHP): F G [(F finite ˅ G finite) ∀ ∀ → (#F = #G ↔ F ≈1-1 G)].
The variant  is  HP where the domain is  restricted to  finite  concepts.  Call  such a  principle  HP-
Weak115. HP-Weak is weaker than FHP as the latter, unlike the former, rules out any infinite concept 
having the same number as a finite concept. However, each avoids being committed to the problem 
cases for HP itself that arise when it is instantiated by concepts that are indefinitely extensible, in 
the sense that for any set S of instances of the concept there is a set of instances which is a proper 
extension of S. Furthermore, the technical questions of whether there is some appropriate version of 
Frege's Theorem underwritten by each principle are answered in the affirmative by Heck's [1997].
These preliminary considerations give us no reason to prefer one approach over the other. However, 
it seems to me that there is likely to be rather more mileage in the conditional principle rather than 
the  restricted  biconditional.  This  can  be  seen  by  comparing  a  purported  justification  of  the 
restriction required by HP-Weak with that required by HP-Sets. The strategy pursued in justifying 
the restriction to concepts with definite extensions was to find some auxiliary principles that could 
be known a priori that would justify the restriction of the domain. However, it is hard to see what 
the equivalent could be in this case.  But without some further basic principle to which we can 
appeal to justify our restricting the domain, it is hard to envisage how we could come up with the 
requisite justification. Given this, I will focus on FHP.
115 The terminology echoes Heck (1997)
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Heck's principle is a conditional rather than a biconditional, but it does not have the same defects as 
ICHP. It is not vacuously true by falsity of antecedent in all (relevantly) empty domains, as the 
condition imposed by the antecedent is a condition on concepts rather than objects. Of course, as 
FHP is  not  an  abstraction  it  cannot  be  assumed  to  have  whatever  privileged  epistemic  status 
abstraction principles are required by the neo-logicist to have; however, there may well be some 
other way of establishing that it has the relevant status.
As indicated in chapter 2, FHP cannot be taken to be analytic because there is no prior notion of 
cardinality of which we can say that FHP is analytic. However, all that we require at this point is an 
a priori principle that can explain our knowledge of arithmetic – specifically of finite arithmetic. It 
seems to me that FHP is a strong candidate for such a principle. Its a priori status need not be 
informed by any deeper principle – it seems that if one sets aside more general misgivings about the 
possibility of a priori knowledge, then FHP is a likely principle to be known to be true without 
requiring any justification from experience. It is surely a knowable principle about counting and 
finite arithmetic that any two finite concepts will have the same number of things falling under them 
iff they are equinumerous; but equally, any justification for that need not make reference to any kind 
of experience.
The issue pressed in chapter 2 was that FHP failed to characterise any pre-existent notion; as such, 
the objection to treating it as analytic was that it failed to say enough, so to speak. However, that 
need not be a barrier to taking it to be a priori; the constraint that there be some extant notion 
characterised by our principle that comes from the demand for analyticity simply does not apply. 
The only kind of adequacy constraint in operation here comes from the need for our choice of HP* 
to serve as a foundation for arithmetic – in other words, that some version of Frege's theorem with 
HP* replacing HP goes through. As demonstrated by Heck, FHP satisfies this constraint. Therefore 
there seem to be no specific objections to treating FHP as a priori. This is of course not to rule out 
the  possibility  that  there  may  be  more  general reasons  for  taking  FHP to  be  an  inadequate 
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foundation for arithmetic; but unlike HP there is nothing specifically wrong with it. The point here 
is that FHP is a better auxiliary principle than its competitors, and that as such if neo-logicism is to 
be vindicated at all, its best chance is by way of an adoption of FHP.
§4: Conclusion
I have aimed in this chapter to clarify two points that play an important role in any more general 
assessment of the neo-logicist  strategy.  The first  is  that  there is  a  tension of sorts  between the 
linguistic nature of the resolution of Benacerraf's challenge envisaged in chapter 1 and the purely 
epistemological target of showing that an abstraction (or something relevantly similar) is a priori. 
But if this tension can be shown to be relatively unproblematic, as my assessment suggests, then the 
second (more positive)  conclusion is  that  the most  plausible  way to  develop the a  neo-logicist 
epistemology of arithmetic is by explaining our knowledge of arithmetic in terms of our a priori 
knowledge of FHP.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have investigated some underexplored options for the neo-logicist about arithmetic. I 
have  argued  that  taking  Benacerraf's  challenge  to  the  acceptability  of  any  philosophy  of 
mathematics is a good starting point, as it helps to bring into focus the problems of knowledge and 
reference that beset any philosophy of arithmetic that posits the existence of abstract objects. The 
core of the neo-logicist proposal is, I have argued, the Context Principle; it is that which offers a 
linguistic solution to the knowledge and reference problems. We can use it to explain the ability that 
we in fact have to refer to mathematical abstract objects and the knowledge of facts about those 
objects that we in fact have.
A natural  development  of  this  line  of  thought  made  essential  use  of  abstraction  principles;  in 
particular, Wright argued that at least one such principle – Hume's Principle – can be analytic. The 
thought  is  that  if  Hume's  Principle  is  analytic,  then  its  analyticity  will  be  conferred  on  its 
recognisable  logical  consequences.  By Frege's  Theorem, such consequences  include  elementary 
number theory. Thus it is possible to explain our knowledge of the truths of (at least) arithmetic by 
appealing to our understanding of the meaning of the terms which, by analyticity, is sufficient for 
knowledge to  be  possible.  Modulo  various  worries  about  the  coherence  of  any such notion  of 
analyticity,  this  argument  stands  or  falls  with  whether  or  not  Hume's  Principle  is  analytic.  I 
demonstrated in chapter 2 that this key premise is false, and hence that Wright's conclusion – that 
arithmetic is analytic – is not sufficiently well supported by his argument.
Nonetheless, given the  epistemological nature of the challenge to a platonist theory, it  seems as 
though there is room to say that the same structure of argument could be used to confer some other 
epistemological status on at least basic arithmetic. In the more exploratory final chapter, I discussed 
whether there really was space for such a solution. I then investigated two possible attempts to 
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instantiate  this  kind  of  epistemological  neo-logicist  solution  –  treating  the  principle  on  which 
arithmetical knowledge was to be founded as an explanation of our concept of cardinal number, and 
treating it as  knowable a priori. I  indicated that the latter attempt seemed more promising as a 
strategy, and that in turn it was best fleshed out by relying on Finite Hume's Principle.
In giving an assessment of different neo-logicist strategies, I have raised a number of issues (if only 
to set many of them to one side) which arise at varying levels of generality. Chapter 1 contained a 
discussion  of  a  very  general  form  of  scepticism  and  a  correspondingly  general  technique  for 
circumnavigating  the  problem.  In  contrast,  chapters  2  and  3  looked  at  more  specific  possible 
developments of this general strategy. As such, the viability of the relatively positive suggestions of 
chapter 3 are open to question in both a general and a specific manner. Three particularly important 
examples  of  a  kind of  more general  scepticism are  as  follows;  firstly there are  serious  doubts 
brought to prominence by Dummett about the inadmissability of abstractions as explanations of any 
kind. Secondly, one can argue that the neo-logicist strategy of appealing to the Context Principle as 
a principle governing reference is misguided. Thirdly, one could query Frege's view (inherited by 
neo-logicists) that numbers are numbers of concepts – for instance, one could instead take it that 
Cantor's set-theoretic framework is superior. Whilst these issues are interesting and important for a 
neo-logicist, they can be and have been set aside in the foregoing discussion.
The specific grounds for doubt seem to me rather more interesting, as they query whether or not 
there is any room for a solution of the kind envisaged in the final chapter. One issue (albeit still a 
relatively general  one)  is  exactly what  it  would take for the candidate  principles  to  serve as a 
foundation for arithmetic to be a priori but non-analytic. More specifically still, there is more to say 
about whether or not neo-logicism can abandon analytic principles so lightly – does the appeal to 
the Context Principle rule out a later appeal to anything weaker than analyticity?
I  have  offered  considerations  in  favour  of  treating  the  neo-logicist  strategy  for  resolving  the 
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Benacerrafian challenge as a viable option, but have pointed out a particular shortcoming of an 
extant attempt to make the strategy work. However, if  it  is legitimate to retain as many of the 
insights  of  the  rejected  programme as  possible  by developing  a  neo-logicist  theory of  a  priori 
arithmetic (rather than of analytic arithmetic), then such a theory based on Finite Hume's Principle 
has clear epistemological advantages over its competitors.
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